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INTRODUCTION
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution bars any state
from "deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."1 It has been the critical constitutional
weapon in the battle against state-sanctioned racism ever since the
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision in Brown v. Board of
Education.' More recently, however, in an effort to extinguish all
forms of race-based legislation, the Supreme Court has extended the
application of the Fourteenth Amendment to state programs
ostensibly designed to combat the effects of racial discrimination.
Shaw v. Reno4 represents another step in the Court's effort. In
Shaw, a five-Justice majority held that North Carolina may have
violated the Fourteenth Amendment by adopting a congressional
reapportionment plan that included districts so bizarrely shaped that
the plan appeared to be an "obvious pretext" for racial classification.5
As a result of this holding, voting systems that cannot be explained on
grounds other than race are constitutional only where narrowly
tailored to fulfill a compelling state interest.'
Notably, the Court in Shaw v. Reno shunned precedents limiting the
application of the Fourteenth Amendment to state action that
deprives individuals of a cognizable individual or group right.7 Those
decisions had presented major barriers to plaintiffs seeking to
challenge voting systems designed with race in mind. Therefore, if
Shaw eventually is read to condemn not only "obvious pretexts" for
racial classification, but also all voting systems in which race is a
substantial or motivating consideration, attempts to increase minority
representation in state legislatures and the U.S. Congress will be in
grave danger. With that concern in mind, this Note attempts to
divine the intended scope of Shaw v. Reno and develop a coherent
means of implementing the decision.
Part I introduces the legal standards relevant to the case. Part II
provides the factual background of Shaw v. Reno and the Supreme
Court's analysis of the case. Part III considers the Court's holding in
detail by addressing three questions concerning the decision's future
application. Finally, Part IV provides a three-stage analysis for
implementing Shaw.
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 16-21,
at 1515 (2d ed. 1988) (commenting that Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment
has been primary tool for "overturning ... injurious legislative acts, judicial decisions, and
executive or administrative choices that are motivated by racial or other unacceptable types of
bias").
3. See infra Part I-A-1 (discussing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989)).
4. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
5. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2825 (1993).
6. Id. at 2832.
7. See id. at 2829-30 (distinguishing vote-dilution decisions as analytically distinct from
claim that reapportionment plan constitutes racial classification); infra Part I-A-2 (discussing
Washington v. Davis).
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I. BACKGROUND
The first sentence of the majority opinion in Shaw v. Reno acknowl-
edges that the decision lies at the intersection of the Fourteenth
Amendment's application to racial classification and voting rights.8
Shaw involved racial classification because the plaintiffs alleged that
the lines in North Carolina's congressional redistricting plan were
drawn on the basis of race.9 Alternatively, the case concerned the
right to vote because "[a] reapportionment statute typically does not
classify persons at all; it classifies tracts of land, or addresses."'" The
plan therefore determined which ballots were cast in which district,
not how the State treated a particular racial group.
Understanding the distinctions between the law applied to voting
rights and the law applied to racial classification provides great insight
into the issues raised by Shaw v. Reno. While both areas of
jurisprudence have roots in the history of discrimination in the
United States, they have diverged over time and are now subject to
different standards of review. The Court's application of these two
areas of law was therefore critical to the outcome in Shaw.
A. Racial Classifications and Individual Rights
De jure discrimination against minorities, the rule for much of
American history, initially was legitimated by the Supreme Court."
In the 1950s and early 1960s, however, the Court adopted the view
that express discrimination on the basis of race violated individual
rights inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal
protection. 12 Measures that are explicitly racially discriminatory thus
8. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. CL at 2819 (noting that case involved "the meaning of the
constitutional 'right' to vote, and the propriety of race-based state legislation designed to benefit
members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups").
9. Id. at 2821.
10. Id. at 2826.
11. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1896) (declaring constitutional Louisiana
statute that required railway companies to provide "equal but separate" accommodations for
black and white passengers). It is widely accepted that by upholding the "separate-but-equal"
doctrine, the Court in P/essy provided both the doctrinal and constitutional framework for racial
segregation. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITTIONAL LAW § 14.5, at 605 (4th
ed. 1991).
12. See, e.g., Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395, 395 (1964) (stating that public auditorium may
not be racially segregated);Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (holding that state may
no longer constitutionally require segregation of courtroom seating); State Athletic Comm'n v.
Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533, 533 (1959) (declaring unconstitutional Athletic Commission rules
designed to prevent white and black boxers from competing against each other); Gayle v.
Browder, 352 U.S. 903, 903 (1956) (holding that statute permitting segregation on public buses
violates Equal Protection Clause); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, 879 (1955) (declaring
rule prohibiting blacks from playing on municipal golf courses unconstitutional); Mayor of
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are subject to strict judicial scrutiny and are sustained only where
narrowly tailored to fulfill a compelling state interest.
13
1. Explicit classifications: City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 14 exemplifies the Supreme
Court's recent treatment of explicit racial classifications. Croson
involved a Richmond, Virginia affirmative action program that
required the city to subcontract at least thirty percent of all city
contracting funds to businesses owned and controlled by minori-
ties. 5 A white-owned-and-controlled construction firm, which had
been awarded a contract but claimed that it was unable to meet the
subcontracting requirement," alleged that the program constituted
racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
17
The city defended the program as a benign effort to rectify the effects
of historical discrimination. 18
Five Justices concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment applied to
state and local affirmative action programs in the same fashion as it
did to the discriminatory classifications considered in the 1950s and
1960s. 1' The plurality opinion provided three justifications for
applying strict scrutiny.2" First, just as earlier racially discriminatory
practices had violated the individual rights of minorities, the
construction preference discriminated against white contractors, who
Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, 877 (1955) (holding that segregation of public beaches and
bathhouses is unconstitutional); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (declaring
segregated schools unconstitutional by overruling "separate-but-equal" framework of Pessy v.
Ferguson in school context because "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal").
Beginning with Brown, these cases established that explicit state-instituted racial classifications
would be subject to strict scrutiny review.
13. SeeShawv. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824-25 (1993) (discussing development of standard
of review applied to racial classifications).
14. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
15. See City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1989).
16. Id. at 482-83.
17. Id. at 476.
18. Id. at 498.
19. Id. at 493 (plurality opinion); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 493 (plurality opinion). In contrast to the strict scrutiny standard of review
applied to local and state affirmative action programs in Croson, the Court in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), applied the less stringent intermediate standard
of review to a federal affirmative action program. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,
564-65 (1990). At issue in Metro Broadcasting were two minority-preference programs designed
to promote minority ownership of radio stations. Id. at 552. The Court justified the less
stringent standard of review because the FCC minority-ownership programs were "ap-
proved-indeed, mandated-by Congress." Id. at 563. Thus, by upholding the affirmative
action program, the Court deferred to Congress, a co-equal branch of government. The Court
found that the remedial measures "serve[d] important governmental objectives within the power
of Congress and [were] substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Id. at 564-65.
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were prevented from competing equally with minority contractors.21
Second, the racial classification itself "carr[ied] a danger of stigmatic
harm. 22 Finally, it was not possible to tell whether the program was
truly benign without applying the strict scrutiny standard, which would
"'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative
body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly
suspect tool."
23
Applying this standard, the Court struck down the Richmond
program as violative of the Equal Protection Clause.24  While an
affirmative action program would fulfill a compelling state interest
where there was a "'strong basis in evidence for [the] conclusion that
remedial action was necessary,' ''25 there was no specific evidence of
previous discrimination in the Richmond construction industry.
26
Moreover, because the thirty percent set-aside was based on the
"'completely unrealistic' assumption that minorities will choose a
particular trade in lockstep proportion to their representation in the
local population," the Court did not consider the program to be
narrowly tailored.27
2. Facially neutral classifications: Washington v. Davis
The Supreme Court has also addressed "facially neutral" measures,
which, while not expressly mentioning race, nonetheless are alleged
to discriminate on the basis of race.28 In Washington v. Davis,' the
Court considered a challenge to "Test 21," the District of Columbia
Police Department's admissions examination, which black applicants
disproportionately failed.3' Several black police officer candidates
who had failed the exam sued the city alleging that the test violated
the Fourteenth Amendment.31 The plaintiffs did not provide any
direct evidence that the city had purposefully discriminated against
21. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 499, 511.
25. Id. at 500 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 477 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)).
26. Id. at 499.
27. Id. at 507 (quoting Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,494 (1986) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
28. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976). In a facially neutral measure, "the
necessary discriminatory racial purpose [is not] express[ed] or [does not] appear on the face
of the statute." Id.
29. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
30. Davis, 426 U.S. at 234-35, 237 (acknowledging that four times as many black candidates
as white candidates failed test).
31. Id. at 232-33.
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blacks, arguing instead that the failure rate itself objectively estab-
lished that the test was unconstitutionally discriminatory.
3 2
The Supreme Court, by a seven-to-two majority, held that the
Fourteenth Amendment forbids only purposeful discrimination. 3
Additionally, although evidence of disproportionate impact could
provide inferential evidence of a discriminatory purpose, it could not
alone establish a constitutional violation. 34 Because the plaintiffs
could not prove directly that the test was "a purposeful device to
discriminate," their claim was therefore dismissed.35 One year later,
the Supreme Court expounded on the purpose requirement, holding
that the Equal Protection Clause is violated when race is a "substan-
tial" or "motivating" factor in the State's decisionmaking
3. Vote-Dilution and Group Rights
Although the right to vote is fundamental,37 racial minorities
historically have faced substantial obstacles as they tried to exercise
the franchise. Until barred from doing so by the Fifteenth Amend-
ment,3" States adopted measures that explicitly prevented minorities
from voting or, alternatively, granted the franchise only to white
males.3 9  After the Fifteenth Amendment was adopted, States
32. Id. at 235.
33. Id. at 242.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 252.
36. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
37. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (describing right to vote as "preservative
of other basic civil and political rights").
38. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV, § 1 (providing that right to vote may "not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude"). Other constitutional provisions prohibit poll taxes in federal elections, id. amend.
XXIV, § 1, and determine that the minimum voting age may not be set above age 18, id.,
amend. XXVI, § 1. Additionally, the Fourteenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny review of
racial classifications that impede access to voting. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S.
621, 626-27 (1969) (requiring "exacting examination" of state voting requirements to ensure
citizens' effective voice in governmental affairs); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding that Equal Protection Clause bars invidious discrimination in
voting restrictions); TIBE, supra note 2, § 13-10, at 1085 ("The most formidable constitutional
obstacle for most franchise restrictions, however, is the Equal Protection Clause."). For example,
while all prospective voters may constitutionally be required to pass a literacy test, a government
requirement that only blacks take the test would be subject to strict scrutiny. See Louisiana v.
United States, 380 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1965) (striking down test requiring voters to engage in
constitutional interpretation because registrars used test to exclude black voters); cf Lane v.
Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939) (holding that Fifteenth Amendment "nullifies sophisticated
as well as simple-minded" means of preventing blacks from voting).
39. See Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the
Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 11 (1985) (explaining that after
withdrawal of federal troops from much of South in 1876, " [a]Imost immediately, Negroes were
disenfranchised"); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & William C. Smith, The Hughes Court and the
Beginning of the End of the "Separate But Equal" Doctrin 76 MINN. L. REv. 1099, 1125 (1992)
(describing persistent discrimination against black voters throughout South).
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attempted to preserve the privileged status of whites" by adopting
various facially neutral means of discrimination, such as poll taxes,
literacy tests, and grandfather clauses, that prevented blacks from
voting.4' Additionally, States implemented measures to reduce the
likelihood that black candidates would win elections.4 These "vote-
40. See Higginbotham & Smith, supra note 39, at 1125 (explaining desire of whites to
maintain political power).
41. See, e.g., Harper, 383 U.S. at 666 (discussing Virginia's poll taxes, which excluded poor
blacks from voting); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,310-13 (1966) (recounting how
Southern states enacted measures, such as literacy tests, specifically designed to prevent blacks
from voting and structured safeguards so that whites, including those who were illiterate, would
not be deprived of right to vote); Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45,
53-54 (1959) (describing literacy tests requiring that all prospective voters be able to read and
write any section of North Carolina Constitution); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 350-52
(1915) (discussing grandfather clause that freely granted right to vote to descendants of families
that could vote before enactment of Fifteenth Amendment). Although such laws were facially
neutral, the Court held that these measures violated the Fourteenth Amendmentwhere they had
the purpose and effect of discriminating.
This standard is illustrated by Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985). In that case,
Alabama citizens challenged § 182 of the Alabama Constitution, which barred voting by any
person convicted of committing a crime "of moral turpitude." ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. VIII,
§ 2. This class of offenses omitted serious crimes, such as second degree manslaughter,
encompassing instead specific misdemeanors disproportionately committed by blacks. Hunter,
471 U.S. at 226-27. The plaintiffs, who were disenfranchised because they had been convicted
of passing bad checks, alleged that their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection was
violated. Id at 225.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, applied the standard that "[p] resented with
a neutral state law that produces disproportionate effects along racial lines . . . '[p]roof of
racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.'" Id. at 227-28 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 265 (1977)). To satisfy this test, the plaintiffs provided evidence that the provision had
been adopted with the purpose of fostering white supremacy. See id. at 229. The Court found
that race was a "but-for" motivation for the enactment of the provision, notwithstanding the
State's claim that the provision was also intended to disenfranchise poor whites. Id. at 232. Ad-
ditionally, the plaintiffs established that the restriction had the effect of disenfranchising blacks
much more often than whites. See id. at 227 (sustaining circuit court's finding that 10 times as
many blacks were disenfranchised as whites). Accordingly, the Court struck down the provision
as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 233.
42. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2823 (1993) (discussing how guarantee of equal
access to polls does not ensure elimination of other racially discriminatory voting practices).
The Court in Shaw noted that various vote-dilution techniques, such as multi-member or at-large
electoral systems, can be just as detrimental to the minority voting rights as an "'absolute
prohibition on casting a ballot.'" Id. (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569
(1969)); see also Linda F. Williams, The Constitution and the Civil Rights Movement: The Quest for
a More Perfect Union, in VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON THE
HISTORY OF VOTING AND VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA 97, 100 (Donald W. Rogers ed., 1990)
(listing barriers to electoral participation by blacks). Specifically, the barriers include:
(1) minority vote dilution through sophisticated legal and administrative barriers such
as at-large electoral systems, racial gerrymandering, unfair candidate slating procedures,
and run-off requirements; (2) class barriers to participation such as poverty and lack
of education; (3) psychological barriers such as lack of a habit of voting derived from
years of exclusion from voting, fear, deference to whites, apathy; and (4) institutional
obstacles such as the problem of inadequate information concerning voter registration
requirements and procedures, the often inconvenient time and place of registration,
and the scarcity of black registration officials, especially in the South.
Williams, supra, at 100.
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dilution" techniques sprang from the recognition that the voting
strength of blacks as a group could be manipulated to make it much
less likely that a black candidate would win an election."
1. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey
One vote-dilution technique was "racial gerrymandering," the
manipulation of electoral boundaries along racial lines.44 Racial
gerrymandering took several forms: minority communities were
"packed" into a single district to decrease their influence across the
41~ 46state, "stacked" in a district with an even larger white majority,
or "cracked" into several districts to minimize their strength in any
one district.
47
In United Jewish Organizations v. Carey (uJO) ,48 the Supreme Court
considered a challenge to a New York legislative reapportionment 9
that "cracked" a white Hasidic community into two districts, thus
43. See Williams, supra note 42, at 102 (explaining that vote-dilution techniques have effect
of denying blacks and other minorities opportunity to cast "meaningful" ballot, which, in turn,
prevents minorities from electing candidate of their choice).
44. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2823 (defining racial gerrymandering as "'the deliberate
and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries . . . for [racial] purposes'") (quoting Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))
(alterations in original). Gerrymandering is theoretically possible whenever the boundaries of
any political subdivision are altered. See BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 687 (6th ed. 1990) (stating
that gerrymandering occurs in process of "dividing a state or other territory into the authorized
civil or political divisions"). No consensus, however, exists as to how much boundary lines may
be manipulated before gerrymandering has occurred. See, e.g., Charles Backstrom et al., Issues
in Gerrymandering. An Exploratory Measure of Partisan GenymanderingApplied to Minnesota, 62 MINN.
L. REV. 1121, 1122 n.7 (1978) (applying threshold of "excessive manipulation" of boundaries);
Richard L. Engstrom, Post-Census Representational Districting. The Supreme Court, "One Person, One
Vote, "and the Gerrymandering Issue, 7 S.U. L. REV. 173,217 (1981) (describingjudiciary's attempts
to measure gerrymandering as very subjective); Bernard Grofman & Harold A. Scarrow, Current
Issues in Reapportionment 4 LAW & POL'Y Q. 435, 454 (1982) (analyzing gerrymandering as
"discriminat[ion] against" a group of voters).
Not only is it unclear what actions constitute gerrymandering, but any number of motives may
be involved. See, e.g., Kirksey v. Board of Superiors, 468 F. Supp. 285, 299 (S.D. Miss. 1979)
(discussing racial motivation); Nickel v. School Bd., 61 N.W.2d 566, 575 (Neb. 1953) (referring
to unreasonable or "unlawful" purpose); State ex reL Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 126 N.W.2d 551,
564 (Wis. 1964) (analyzing partisan motivation); State v. Whitford, 11 N.W. 424 (Wis. 1882)
(discussing religion, nationality, and "improper" purposes).
Furthermore, attempts to define gerrymandering may be fruitless because they assume that
there is some neutral way to draw the boundaries of political subdivisions. See Daniel H.
Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Question for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest:
Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1985) (arguing that there is no way to identify
neutral plan because selection criteria used to arrive at plan are necessarily subjective and
biased).
45. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. CL at 2840 (White,J., dissenting) (citing Voinovich v. Quilter, 113
S. CL 1149, 1155 (1993)).
46. Id. (citing Frank R. Parker, Racial Gernymandering and Legislative Reapportionment in
MINoRrrY VOTE DmrurioN 85, 92 (C. Davidson ed., 1984)).
47. Id. (citing Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 422 (1977)).
48. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
49. United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 148 (1977).
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raising the proportion of one district's minority population to sixty-
five percent.50 Representatives of the Hasidic community challenged
the New York plan, alleging "that they were assigned to electoral
districts solely on the basis of race, and that this racial assignment
diluted their voting power.""
The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' claims. Two Justices,
relying on Washington v. Davis,52 held that the intentional use of race
to increase minority electoral success did not constitute purposeful
discrimination against whites.5" A separate three-Justice plurality
held that the plaintiffs had not established a sufficient discriminatory
effect because, while cases such as Croson and Davis had been
grounded in the individual right to be free from racial discrimination,
"The individual voter in the district with a nonwhite majority has no
constitutional complaint merely because his candidate has lost out at
the polls . . . . Some candidate, along with his supporters, always
loses."54 The plurality therefore required the plaintiffs to establish
a violation of their group right to not be excluded from the political
process.55 Because whites constituted sixty-five percent of the county
population and remained a majority in seventy percent of the
electoral districts, the plurality held that no such discriminatory effect
existed. 56
2. Mobile v. Bolden
States employed other vote-dilution techniques, such as the use of
multi-member and at-large election systems, to ensure that white votes
always outnumbered black votes.5 7  In Mobile v. Bolden,58 the Su-
preme Court considered the at-large system of electing the three-
member city commission of Mobile, Alabama.59 Under the at-large
50. Id. at 152. The State initially enacted a plan that assigned the white Hasidic community
to a single electoral district. Id. The United States Attorney General rejected that plan pursuant
to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988), because several districts did not have
a sufficiently large minority population. UJO, 430 U.S. at 152-53; see also infra notes 76-78 and
accompanying text (describing operation of § 5).
51. UJO, 430 U.S. at 153.
52. See supra Part I-A-2 (discussing Davis).
53. UJO, 430 U.S. at 179-80 (Stewart, J, concurring).
54. Id. at 166 (plurality opinion).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2823 (1993) (describing use of multi-member and
at-large systems to reduce ability of minority groups to elect candidates of their choice). The
genre of single-member districts at issue in UJO emerged as a result of courts striking down at-
large systems, like the one at issue in Bolden, on vote-dilution grounds.
58. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
59. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 58 (1980) (plurality opinion).
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system, every voter voted for all three commissioners.' ° Because
voting was racially polarized61 and whites constituted a majority of
the population,62 white candidates always garnered more votes than
black candidates.63 As a result, no black candidate had been elected
to the city commission in sixty-five years, despite the fact that blacks
constituted slightly more than one-third of the Mobile population. 
4
Black voters challenged the system on the grounds that it diluted their
voting strength in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments.
65
In a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs'
claims. A four-Justice plurality, applying Washington v. Davis, held that
the plaintiffs must prove that the city had engaged in purposeful
discrimination.' The plurality gauged discriminatory purpose by the
same group-rights standard used by the [JO plurality to gauge
discriminatory effect: exclusion from the political process.67 Thus,
"legislative apportionments could violate the Fourteenth Amendment
if their purpose were invidiously to minimize or cancel out the voting
potential of racial or ethnic minorities."' Because the plaintiffs
failed to prove that Mobile had adopted the at-large system with the
required discriminatory intent, the Court dismissed their claim.69
3. The Voting Rights Act
Reacting to voting discrimination, Congress enacted the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.70 The VRA was intended "to banish the blight
of racial discrimination in voting which ha[d] infected the electoral
process in parts of our country for nearly a century. 71  While its
terms encompass a variety of voting rights, sections 2 and 5 of the
VRA are particularly relevant to Shaw v. Reno.
As amended in 1982, section 272 codifies the standard that the UJO
plurality drew from the Fourteenth Amendment: those voting systems
60. See id. at 59-60.
61. Id. at 98 (White, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 58 n.1 (plurality opinion).
63. See id. at 73 (discussing black electoral losses).
64. Id. at 58 n.1.
65. See id. at 58.
66. Id. at 66-67.
67. Id. at 66.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 70 (holding that "evidence in the present case fell far short of showing"
purposeful discrimination).
70. Pub. L. No. 89-110,79 Stat. 445 (1965) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974e
(1988)).
71. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
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that have the effect of excluding a racial group from the political
process are unlawful.73 Unlike Mobile v. Bolden, however, section 2
applies even where no purposeful discrimination occurs.74  In
Thornburg v. Gingles,75 the Supreme Court held that section 2 applies
where three conditions are satisfied: (1) the minority group must be
"sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority
in a single-member district"; (2) the minority group must be
"politically cohesive"; and (3) the majority must "vote[] sufficiently as
a bloc to enable it. . . usually to defeat the minority's preferred
candidate."76
Under section 5, a state with a history of voting discrimination must
receive federal approval, or "preclearance," from either the U.S.
Attorney General or a special threejudge panel of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia before implementing any change
in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting.""
Section 5 preclearance will be refused if the submitting authority
cannot establish78 that "the submitted change [does not have] the
purpose ... or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote."
79
In this context, discriminatory effect is gauged by whether the change
will either lead to a "retrogression" in minority voting strength"0 or
constitute a "clear violation" of section 2.81
73. See id. § 1973(b) (applying VRA to circumstances where group members "have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice").
74. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986) (stating that in response to Mobile v.
Bolden, Congress revised § 2 to prohibit discriminatory effect alone); see also Daniel D. Polsby &
Robert D. Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry into the Problem of Racial Gerrymandering Under the Voting Rights
Ac 92 MICH. L. REv. 652, 655 (1993) (explaining that § 2 was amended in reaction to Mobile
v. Bolden to provide "Bolden-type" relief beyond protections of Constitution).
75. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
76. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51. The Ginglesstandard was formally extended to single-member
districts in Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1084 (1993).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988). Section 5 coverage may extend over an entire state or be
limited to specific counties. See id. § 1973b(a) (1) (noting application "with respect to such
[political] subdivision as a separate unit" from state).
78. 28 C.FR. § 51.52(a) (1993) (assigning burden of proof to submitting authority).
79. Id.
80. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140-42 (1976).
81. 28 C.F.R § 51.55(b)(2) (1993).
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A. The Facts
The 435 seats in the U.S. House of Representatives are distributed
among the states on the basis of population. 2 A roughly proportion-
ate distribution of seats is maintained by altering the number assigned
to each state every ten years according to the results of the U.S.
census. 3 It was through this process that, in 1990, North Carolina
gained a twelfth congressional district.8 4 With an additional district
to fit within the state, the North Carolina General Assembly set out to
reapportion its congressional map.
The General Assembly had to consider several factors when it began
the reapportionment process. An initial concern was a federal
constitutional requirement that all of the state's districts have almost
identical populations.' A second concern for the predominantly
Democratic General Assembly was its partisan desire to see members
of the Democratic party elected from the state by designing most of
the districts to include a majority of Democratic voters.8" The design
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
83. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 738 (1983) (holding that census is only reliable
measure of districts' relative populations); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 532 (1969)
(rejecting use of inaccurate census data).
84. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2819 (1993).
85. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2; see Karcher, 462 U.S. at 734 (stating that all practicable steps must
be taken to avoid even small population variations). This requirement has had a direct impact
on district shape. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts,"
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV.
483,574 (1993) (noting that equal population requirement has resulted in compromise of other
considerations, including compactness). With an odd-numbered population of 6,628,637, Brief
for Federal Appellees at app. D, Shawv. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-357) [hereinafter
Federal Brief], North Carolina could not be divided into 12 exactly equal districts, but it could
come very close. The largest district in the State's final reapportionment plan had a population
of 552,387, only one more person than the smallest district. Id.
86. John Hood, Republican Quota Flasco, REASON, Nov. 1993, at 51, 51; see also Shaw v. Reno,
113 S. Ct. at 2841 n.10 (White,J., dissenting) (discussing influence of partisan factors in design
of North Carolina plan). One very effective way of facilitating a political party's success is to
create districts with a majority of voters who favor that party. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S.
109, 128 (1986) (noting that legislators' knowledge of "likely political composition" allows design
of districts that probably will result in election of particular party's representative). In 1986, the
Supreme Court tried to reduce extreme "partisan gerrymandering" by holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment bars reapportionment plans that have both the purpose and effect of
discriminating against a political group. Id. at 127. A lawsuit filed before Shaw v. Reno and with
different plaintiff claimed that the North Carolina reapportionment plan constituted an
unconstitutional political gerrymander. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 397 (W.D.N.C.), afd,
113 S. Ct. 3 (1992). The plaintiffs alleged that the General Assembly, in an attempt to protect
Democratic incumbents, had not created a majority-black district in the southern part of the
state. Id. at 396. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Bandeme, a three-judge district
court panel dismissed the suit because the state had designed several districts with an electoral
majority of Republican voters. Id. at 397. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed. Pope v.
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of the State's final reapportionment plan was most notable, however,
for the influence of two other factors: race and incumbency.
North Carolina's voting-age population is approximately seventy-
eight percent white, twenty percent black, and two percent other
minorities." Despite the size of the black population, a black
congressional representative had not been elected from the state in
this century.88 The Supreme Court, through decisions such as Mobile
v. Bolden, 9 had ruled that electoral systems enacted with the purpose
of discriminating on the basis of race were unconstitutional.'
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act similarly prohibited electoral
systems that resulted in a discriminatory effect.91 With a voting-age
population that is twenty percent black, North Carolina was therefore
under both constitutional and statutory pressure to create one or
more districts with a majority of black voters (majority-black districts).
The crucial issues were how many majority-black districts to create and
where to place them.
While the black population of North Carolina is generally dis-
persed, one major area of concentration lies along the state's coastal
plain.92 Fully aware of this fact, the General Assembly voted to enact
a reapportionment plan that included a single majority-black district
centered in the northern part of that region.93 By designing only
one of the twelve districts to be majority-black, the State increased the
re-election chances of its eleven white incumbent representatives.
9 4
Because forty of the state's 100 counties have a history of voting
discrimination on the basis of race,95 North Carolina is subject to
section 5 of the VRA. 6  The State accordingly submitted the
Blue, 113 S. Ct. 3 (1992).
87. Federal Brief, supra note 85, at app. D.
88. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2843 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 38-41 (1986) (recounting history of electoral discrimination in North
Carolina).
89. 446 U.S. 55 (1979); see also supra Part I-B-2 (discussing Bolden).
90. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1979) (stating that Fifteenth Amendment forbids
racial discrimination in regard to voting); see also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982)
(holding that Fourteenth Amendment prohibits multi-member districts intended to discriminate
on basis of race); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973) (holding that State may not use
multi-member districts to dilute voting strength of racial minorities); Allen v. State Bd, of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) (acknowledging that "[t]he right to vote can be affected by
a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot").
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
92. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2820 (citing OLt GADE & H. DANIEL STILLWELL, NORTH
CAROLINA: PEOPLE AND ENVIRONMENTS 65-68 (1986)).
93. Id.
94. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 517 (arguing that incumbency and desire to
increase Democratic control resulted in bizarre boundaries of district 12).
95. Shawv. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2820.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
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reapportionment plan to the U.S. Attorney General. The Attorney
General in turn refused to preclear the plan because the State had
not established that the reapportionment had been adopted without
a discriminatory intent or effect." This refusal was supported by the
General Assembly's rejection of alternative plans that would have
created a second district in which minorities were a majority of the
population (a majority-minority district).' Rather than fight the
Attorney General's ruling in court, the State went back to the drawing
board.''
In refusing to preclear the North Carolina reapportionment plan,
the Attorney General strongly suggested creating a second majority-
minority district in the southern part of the coastal plain."0 ' This
district would have combined the voting strength of the region's
substantial black and native American populations.102 In consider-
ing this possibility, the General Assembly was concerned with the fate
of Representatives Rose and Hefner, the white Democratic incum-
bents from the southern part of the coastal plain.10 3 Representative
Rose in particular chaired the House subcommittee with jurisdiction
over subsidies for tobacco, a critical North Carolina cash crop.
10 4
His district, district 7, had a high minority population 5 and, as a
general rule, minority voters elect a higher proportion of Democrats
than do white voters. 06 Thus, if too many minority voters were
removed from district 7 and replaced by white voters, Representative
Rose might lose to a Republican. On the other hand, if Rose's
district were designed to be a majority-minority district, he might lose
to a minority candidate.
97. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2820.
98. See Letter from John L Dunne, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, to
Tiare B. Smiley, Special Deputy Attorney General, State of North Carolina (Dec. 18, 1991),
appended to Federal Brief, supra note 85, at app. B10a-11a [hereinafter Letter from Dunne]
(stating that North Carolina had not sustained its burden ofshowing that legislative choices did
not violate § 5 of VRA).
99. Id.
100. Shawv. Reno, 113S. Ct. at 2820.
101. Letter from Dunne, supra note 98, at 10a. The Attorney General suggested that
population patterns made "the south-central to southeastern region of the state" particularly
well-suited for such a district. Id.
102. Federal Brief, supra note 85, at app. D.
103. Joint Exhibit 29, Shaw v. Hunt, No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR (E.D.N.C. Raleigh Div. 1994).
104. See Polsby & Popper, supra note 74, at 653 (noting that race was relevant to North
Carolina legislature "only after they had other, more important fish fried," including protection
of Representative Rose).
105. Federal Brief, supra note 85, at app. D.
106. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 588, 589 n.8 (1993) (describing racial
and ethnic minorities as traditional Democratic voters).
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The General Assembly resolved this tension between race and
incumbency by leaving the southern coastal plain alone. Still seeking
to create a second majority-minority district, the State instead
designed a district that connected North Carolina's other major
concentrations of black residents, urban neighborhoods in the state's
central piedmont region."0 7 When this revised reapportionment
plan (the North Carolina plan) was resubmitted pursuant to section
5, the Attorney General did not object,' and it became law.1"
In their final form, the two majority-black districts ° are best
known for their shapes (see FIGURE 1). The first, district 1, has been
compared to a "bug splattered on a windshield""' and a "Rorschach
ink blot test." '112 Though situated primarily in the northern coastal
plain, the district extends southward in several bands, absorbing
pockets of black populations close to the South Carolina border. 3
The even more infamous district 12, stretches approximately 160 miles
across the center of the state and at times is no wider than Interstate
85, along which it runs (see FIGURE 2).114 Justice O'Connor noted:
107. Shawv. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816,2820 (1993). The State designed district 12 to draw 80%
of its population from cities of 20,000 or more persons. Trial testimony of Gerry Cohen at 331-
35,343-44, Shaw v. Hunt, No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR (E.D.N.C. Raleigh Div. 1994). The primarily rural
district 1, in contrast, draws 80% of its population from areas outside cities of 20,000 or more
persons. Id.
108. Shawv. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2820.
109. 1991 N.C. Extra Sess. Laws ch. 7 (adopted Jan. 24, 1992).
110. The districts were constructed by including portions of 17 of the 19 North Carolina
counties that contained at least 20,000 black residents. Brief for State Appellees at 5, Shaw v.
Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-357) [hereinafter State Brief]. In districts 1 and 12, blacks
constitute a majority of both the total population and "voting-age population." Id. at 5 n.6.
Establishing a majority of the voting-age population is considered essential in redistricting
because total population figures are less likely to reflect accurately those individuals who will cast
ballots. See Angelo N. Ancheta & Kathryn K. Imahara, Multi-Ethnic Voting Rights: Redefining Vote
Dilution in Communities of Color, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 815, 865-66 (1993) (indicating that voting-age
population is more accurate determinant of actual voting strength than total population).
Minority groups tend to have more persons below the age of 18, so the proportion of minority
groups in the total population is greater than their proportion in the voting-age population.
See, e.g., McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937,944 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining that while
blacks are majority in local population in two single-member districts, they do not have majority
voting-age population). Blacks constitute 57.26% of the total population of district 1 but only
53.40% of the voting-age population; for district 12, the figures are 56.63% and 53.34%,
respectively. State Brief, supra, at 83A. In district 1, blacks are 52.41% of the registered voters;
for district 12, the figure is 54.47% Stipulations of the Parties, Shaw v. Hunt, No. 92-202-CIV-5-
BR (E.D.N.C. Raleigh Div. 1994). Blacks make up no more than 21% of the voting-age
population in any other district. State Brief, supra, at 83A. For the state as a whole, blacks
constitute approximately 22% of the total population and 20% of the voting-age population.
Id. Whites, on the other hand, constitute 76% of the state's total population and 78% of the
voting-age population. Id.
111. Political Pornography II, WALL ST.J., Feb. 4, 1992, at A14.
112. Shawv. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461,468 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (Voorhees, CJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), rev'd sub nom. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
113. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2820.









Northbound and southbound drivers on 1-85 sometimes find
themselves in separate districts in one county, only to "trade"
districts when they enter the next county. Of the 10 counties
through which District 12 passes, five are cut into three different
districts; even towns are divided. At one point the district remains
contiguous only because it intersects at a single point with two
other districts before crossing them." 5
In the 1992 congressional elections, North Carolina's first black
representatives since Reconstruction were elected from district 1 and
district 12.116
FIGuRE 2: NORTH CAROLINA DISTRICT 12
o Election Data Services, Inc.
Five white"' registered voters' challenged the North Carolina
115. Id. at 2821 (citing Brief for Republican National Committee as Amicus Curiae at 14-15).
116. Id. at 2843 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
117. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. at 470 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.
Ct. 2816 (1993). This fact has created substantial confusion as to whether Shaw vindicated the
rights of only white voters. Compare, e.g., Bernard Grofman, High Court Ruling Won't Doom Racial
Gerrymandering CHI. TRIB., July 9, 1993, at 19 ("Every newspaper story I have read mistakenly
talks about Shaw in terms of protecting the 'constitutional rights of white voters.'... [T]he
white Republicans who brought Shaw did not allege that whites were harmed by the plan and
'did not even claim to be white.'") withjames A. Barnes, Washington Update, 25 NAT'LJ. 1712,
1712 (1993) (contending that Shaw v. Reno held that North Carolina may have abridged rights
of white voters). The Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno, however, unambiguously held that race
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reapportionment in federal court, claiming that the plan violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' A
divided threejudge panel of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina dismissed the case, holding that the
plaintiffs had failed to state a cognizable claim. 2  The plaintiffs
then appealed to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdic-
tion12 ' and reversed.
122
B. The Supreme Court Decision
In Shaw v. Reno, the Supreme Court addressed the plaintiffs' claim
that North Carolina had engaged in unconstitutional racial gerryman-
dering by drawing bizarrely shaped districts along racial lines.12  In
a five-to-four decision, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had
stated a cognizable claim. 124  Writing for the majority, Justice
O'Connor stated:
Today we hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the
Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina
General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational
on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate
has no bearing on whether an individual may bring a racial gerrymandering claim. See Shaw v.
Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2830 (stating that claim may be brought by voters of any race).
118. The plaintiffs were five residents of Durham County, North Carolina. Shaw v. Barr, 808
F. Supp. at 462. Under the North Carolina plan, three vote in district 12, while two vote in
neighboring district 2. Id. at 464.
119. Id. The plaintiffs sought both declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. The equal
protection issue was the only claim against the State that the Supreme Court resolved. See Shaw
v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2832 (explaining that Court did "not decide whether appellants' complaint
stated a claim under constitutional provisions other than the Fourteenth Amendment"). Before
the district court, the plaintiffs invoked several other constitutional provisions, including the
Fifteenth Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
Article I, §§ 2 and 4 of the Constitution. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. at 468. The Article I, § 4
challenge was based on the theory that North Carolina should have created its congressional
districts without federal control. See id. (citing Complaint at 10-11, 14-15). The district court
rejected that claim, holding that Article I does not prevent Congress from exercising the power
to validate a redistricting plan through the Voting Rights Act. See id.
The plaintiffs' second theory was that Article I, § 2, which provides that the House of
Representatives "shall be composed. . . of the people of the several states," established a
requirement of colorblind districting. Id. This theory was buttressed with references to both
the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 469 n.5. The district
court rejected this claim because Supreme Court precedent held that Article I, § 2 protected
only against the creation of districts with unequal populations. See id. at 469 (citing Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 322 (1973); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)). The district court
subsumed the plaintiffs' remaining Privileges and Immunities Clause and Fifteenth Amendment
claims under the gambit of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
120. Id. at 473.
121. Shawv. Barr, 113 S. Ct. 653 (1992).
122. Shawv. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993).
123. Id. at 2824.
124. Id. at 2832.
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voters into separate voting districts because of their race, and that
the separation lacks sufficient justification."
The case was then remanded to the district court to determine if the
North Carolina plan could be explained in terms other than race and,
if not, whether the plan could satisfy the strict scrutiny standard.
2 6
1. The rejection of individual and group rights
The fundamental barrier to the Shaw v. Reno plaintiffs' claim was
that they could not establish that they were the victims of an injury
previously held cognizable by the Supreme Court. Even though black
candidates had won the elections in districts 1 and 12, an individual-
rights claim was not available to the white Shaw v. Reno plaintiffs
because the Supreme Court in Mobile v. Bolden had refused to
recognize an individual's right to vote for a winning candidate.
127
The Shaw majority similarly rejected out of hand the plaintiffs' claim
that individuals possessed a "constitutional right to participate in a
'color-blind' electoral process." 128
In place of an individual rights theory, the Supreme Court in Bolden
and UJO had turned to a group's right not to be excluded from the
political process.129 This theory, however, was similarly unavailable
in Shaw. As to intent, the plaintiffs did not allege that North Carolina
had purposefully minimized white voting strength. 30 As to effects,
whites constituted eighty percent of the state population but remained
a majority in ten of twelve, or eighty-three percent, of its congressio-
nal districts.'' The plaintiffs, therefore, could not overcome the
UJO plurality's conclusion that unconstitutional vote dilution occurs
only where a group is denied roughly proportional representation in
the political process.
3 2
2. The emergence of social rights
Because the Shaw v. Reno plaintiffs could not state a claim under
either an individual rights or a group rights theory, the Supreme
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (plurality opinion); see also supra Part I-B-2
(discussing Bolden).
128. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 ("This Court never has held that race-conscious state
decisionmaking is impermissible in all circumstances.").
129. See supra notes 54-55, 66-68 and accompanying text (recounting use of group rights
theory in UJO and Bolden).
130. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2838 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that claim would
"strain[] credulity").
131. See id. (applying population statistics).
132. United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 167 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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Court easily could have dismissed the case. The five-Justice majority,
however, declined to do so,'33 instead adopting a never before
recognized theory of social harms. That theory is best understood by
tracing three analytical steps taken by the majority.
First, the majority modified fundamentally, though subtly, the
principle underlying the Fourteenth Amendment's bar to racial
classifications. Previous decisions had recognized that a State may not
discriminate against individuals and groups on the basis of race. In
Croson, the white-owned-and-controlled construction firm claimed to
be unable to compete fairly with minority firms.134 In Bolden, blacks
claimed that the at-large electoral system excluded them from the
political process."3 5 Conversely, under any previously recognized
theory, the white voters in Shaw v. Reno had not been discriminated
against:136  as just noted, there is no right to vote for a winning
candidate 3 7 and whites as a group were proportionally over-
represented under the North Carolina plan.
3 1
According to the majority in Shaw, however, the Fourteenth
Amendment's "central purpose is to prevent the States from purpose-
fully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race."1 39 The
State's failure to utilize any salient individual or group characteristic
to discriminate against the plaintiffs was therefore irrelevant. If the
State adopted a measure "that explicitly distinguish[ed] between
individuals on racial grounds," the plaintiff's claim would then "fall
within the core of [the Fourteenth Amendment's] prohibition." 4 '
The difficulty with applying a bar to explicit classifications in Shaw
v. Reno is that the North Carolina reapportionment plan does not
133. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 (recharacterizing plaintiffs' colorblindness claim
as objection to obvious pretext for racial classification); id. at 2830 (distinguishing vote-dilution
precedents as "analytically distinct"). The Court noted that the plaintiffs did not allege that
white voting power had been diluted and, in fact, had entirely avoided identifying their race in
their complaint. Id. at 2824. Instead, the plaintiffs' claim was that the North Carolina
reapportionment plan was itself a racial classification, as evidenced by the district's bizarre
boundaries. Id. The facts of UJO were therefore distinguishable because the New York
boundaries challenged in that case had been fairly regular in shape. Id. at 2829.
134. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469, 482-83 (1989).
135. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 58 (1980) (plurality opinion).
136. See Jonathan M. Sperling, Recent Development, Equal Protection and Race-Conscious
Reapportionment: Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993), 17 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'y 283, 287 n.37
(explaining that Shaw plaintiffs "suffered [no] immediate injury").
137. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 66 (plurality opinion).
138. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2838 (White, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 2824 (emphasis added). In so doing, the Court rejected the rationale of the
plurality opinion in UJO, which was based on the State's permissible benign use of race. See
supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. This passage may prove to be the lasting legacy of
Shaw. To say that race may not be used to discriminate between, or distinguish, individuals is
very close to saying that race may not be used at all.
140. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2824.
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explicitly mention race, as it includes only geographic data that
denotes the boundaries of various districts. As it is facially neutral, he
plan presumably would be governed by Washington v. Davis.141  In
its second analytical step, however, the majority in Shaw chose to treat
the case as a challenge to an "'obvious pretext for racial classifica-
tion."'142 This distinction is critical for two reasons. First, the Davis
standard requires only that race be a substantial or motivating factor
in the State's decision,' while the significantly more stringent
obvious pretext standard requires proof that the State's decision is
"unexplainable on grounds other than race." " Second, according
to the Court, an obvious pretext is the legal equivalent of an explicit
141. See supra Part I-A-2 (discussing Davis).
142. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2825 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
143. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
144. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. In applying the obvious-pretext standard, the Shaw
v. Reno majority drew primarily on two decisions: Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915),
and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). In Guinn, the Supreme Court considered an
amendment to the Oklahoma State Constitution that required voters to be able to read and
write. Guinn, 238 U.S. at 357. Specifically at issue was a facially neutral "grandfather clause" that
exempted from the literacy test those persons entitled to vote before 1866 and their
descendants. See id. at 358-59 (noting that amendment did not explicitly discriminate based on
race, color, or previous condition of servitude); id. at 364 (explaining that literacy test "contains
no word of discrimination"). The test disenfranchised almost exclusively blacks because before
1870, when the Fifteenth Amendment was adopted, only whites and some Indians could vote
in Oklahoma. Id. at 357. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the grandfather clause
violated the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 364-65.
Gomillion concerned a plan to redraw the city boundary of Tuskegee, Alabama. The
challenged statute created an "uncouth" 28-sided municipal boundary that "fenced out" 99% of
the city's former black voters, but no whites. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340-41. The Supreme Court
held that black citizens who had been removed from the municipal confines by the plan had
a cognizable claim under the Fifteenth Amendment. See id. at 346.
The element common to both Guinn and Gomillion was that the challenged measures, while
not explicit racial classifications, operated in such a fashion as to be unexplainable on grounds
other than race. See Guinn, 238 U.S. at 363 (concluding that Oklahoma amendment "rest[ed]
upon no discernible reason other than the purpose to disregard the prohibitions of the [Fifteenth]
Amendment") (emphasis added); Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346 (holding that when "legislature thus
singles out a readily isolated segment of a racial minority for special discriminatory treatment,
it violates the Fifteenth Amendment"). Both the Oklahoma literacy test and the Tuskegee
boundary excluded almost exclusively blacks. For that reason, the plaintiffs were not required
to prove that they had been subjected to purposeful discrimination. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347;
Guinn, 238 U.S. at 365.
In discussing Guinn and Gomillion, however, the Shaw v. Reno majority omitted a critical
consideration. In both cases the plaintiffs proved that the challenged measures caused
individual or group harms to blacks. The Oklahoma amendment prevented blacks from voting,
Guinn, 238 U.S. at 357, and the Tuskegee boundary deprived blacks of city services and the
ability to vote in municipal elections, Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341. Such a harm was conspicuously
absent in Shaw. See supra notes 127-132 and accompanying text.
1156 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1135
racial classification," and is therefore governed by the standard
applied in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.'
The Court's first two analytical steps still left the fundamental flaw
in the Shaw plaintiffs' claim unaddressed: What cognizable injury had
they suffered? Precluded by precedent from applying either
individual or group rights, the majority chose to announce a
heretofore unrecognized class of social harms.'47 Drawing on the
statement in Croson that racial classifications can cause racial stigmati-
zation, 48 the Court in Shaw v. Reno held that racial classifications
are so "'odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon
the doctrine of equality'" 4  that proof of individual or group harm
is not required to state an actionable claim.'
According to the Court, social harms arise from the public's
perception that the government is engaging in race-based
decisionmaking."' The majority highlighted the distinct nature of
this form of injury with its concern that "obvious[]"f 52 racial gerry-
145. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2825 (1993) (noting that Court would apply "same
close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race"); id. at 2830 (comparing
racial gerrymanders with "other kinds of racial classification"); id. at 2832 (identifying racial
gerrymanders as "[r ] acial classifications with respect to voting"); Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra
note 106, at 614 ("The Court's theory is ultimately that classifications that can only be explained
on the basis of race are just as divisive as those explicitly based on race.").
146. See supra Part I-A-1 (discussing Croson). The classic example of an "obvious pretext" is
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). In that case, the Supreme Court considered a
municipal ordinance that required laundries constructed of wood to receive a permit from the
city board of supervisors. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 357. A permit was granted to all white applicants
except one, but to none of the more than 200 Chinese applicants. Id. at 359. The Court found
this evidence sufficient to establish a constitutional violation, even without any direct evidence
of purposeful discrimination. Id. at 373-74.
147. See Emily Calhoun, Shaw v. Reno: On the Borderline, 65 COLO. L. REv. 137, 138 (1993)
(explaining that Court recognized new form of harm that "did not seem to fit neatly within an
analytical framework prescribed by traditional voting rights cases"); Pildes & Niemi, supra note
85, at 507 (describing theory of harms in Shaw as "social rather than individual"); Leading Case,
Equal Protection-Race-based Districting and Minority Voting Rights, 107 HARV. L. REV. 194, 201
[hereinafter Harvard Leading Case] (noting Justice O'Connor's reliance on "general societal
harm"). But seeAleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 106, at 601-02 (arguing that Court in Shaw
applied individual right "not to be segregated on the basis of one's race in electoral districting
plans"); Robinson 0. Everett, Afterword, 72 N.C. L. REV. 761, 761 (1994) (contending that Shaw
applied individual-rights theory).
148. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 (citing City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion)). Even this statement did not lend substantial support to
the Shaw majority's theory, as Croson addressed only the stigmatization "of individuals by reason
of their membership in a racial group," id. (emphasis added), not social stigmatization generally.
149. Id. (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
150. See id. at 2828 ("Classifying citizens by race . . . threatens special harms."); id.
("[R]eapportionment legislation that cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to
classify and separate voters by race injures voters in other ways."); id. at 2832 ("Racial
classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers.").
151. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 501 (highlighting importance of"social impression
that one legitimate value has come to dominate all others").
152. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
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mandering "signal[s]" and "sends" a "message"15 that "immediately
offends principles of racial equality,"154 the "perception" of which
reinforces "stereotype [s]. '  It is through such perceptions that
"[c]lassifying citizens by race . . . threatens special harms."15 This
theory of social rights applies to both explicit classifications and
obvious pretexts for racial classification.
57
The majority in Shaw v. Reno found that social effects occur in the
reapportionment context when racial gerrymandering is unexplain-
able on grounds other than race. First, an obvious pretext "bears an
uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the
perception that members of the same racial group ... think alike,
share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates
at the polls."' Second, elected representatives develop the false
impression that they should represent only the interests of the racial
group for whom the district was designed,159 a result that "threatens
to undermine our system of representative democracy."
16
III. How FAR DOES SHAW V. RENO EXTEND?
A. The Limited Holding of Shaw: A Purely Objective Inquiry
After City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., challenges to racial
classifications, whether ostensibly benign or not, generally must
proceed directly to the application of strict scrutiny review.161 In the
racial gerrymandering context, however, before strict scrutiny is
applied, 16 Shaw v. Reno requires an involved inquiry into whether
the challenged reapportionment actually constitutes a racial classifica-
tion. Limited to its explicit holding, Shaw requires that the inquiry be
completely objective.' 63
153. Id. at 2827-28.
154. Id. at 2829.
155. Id. at 2827; see also id. at 2824 ("resembles"); id. at 2827 ("resemblance").
156. Id. at 2828.
157. See id. at 2825 (noting that "[t]hese principles apply not only to legislation that contains
explicit racial distinctions, but also to" obvious pretexts).
158. Id. at 2827; see also id. at 2828 (discussing resulting "racial stereotypes").
159. Id. at 2827.
160. Id. at 2828.
161. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (outlining standard applied in Croson).
162. See infra Part IV-E (discussing application of strict scrutiny in racial gerrymandering
context).
163. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824, 2832 (1993) (stating Court's holding and
requiring that examination of reapportionment be "on its face"); Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp.
1188, 1195 (W.D.L.A. 1993), statement ofprob. jur. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. Apr. 12, 1994)
(No. 93-1539) (explaining that Shaw concerns "the problem of proving racial gerrymandering
indirectly or inferentially"). The objective and subjective inquiry can be easily confused. Compare
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The Court applied an objective standard in Shaw because, in theory,
objective factors are the lens through which the public perceives the
State's subjective intent in designing the reapportionment map.
164
For example, boundaries that mirror a coastline appear to have been
drawn by the government in an effort to design a waterfront district.
Objective factors thus serve as proxies for direct evidence of intent;
through them, intent can be inferred.
1 5
This general notion of inferential proof can be applied to the
objective factor most relevant in Shaw itself, shape. The Court was
clear that noncompact districts do not themselves cause a constitution-
ally cognizable injury.66 Instead, distorted boundaries are relevant
for what they represent. Implicit in Shaw is the idea that the public
has developed an expectation that congressional districts will be
relatively compact. 67 When this expectation is fulfilled, no public
suspicions are aroused. On the other hand, when a district is
bizarrely shaped, the public realizes that some other consideration has
become more important to the legislature than compactness.6'
Shaw rests on the theory that the public can in turn determine what
consideration has superseded the norm of compactness. As the
dissentingJustices acknowledged, bizarre boundaries can be a "helpful
indicator " "' and "powerful evidence of an ulterior purpose behind
the shaping of those boundaries." 7 ' Particularly relevant to Shaw,
when the boundaries mirror "racial lines" it becomes apparent that
race has become the overriding consideration in the reapportionment
process.171  It is from this public understanding that social harms
arise from objective factors.
Harvard Leading Case, supra note 147, at 195 (explaining that Court in Shaw held that "race-
based, serpentine cartography gave rise" to Fourteenth Amendment claim) (emphasis added) with
id. ("[T]he Court concluded that race-conscious line-drawingitselfcould violate the Constitution.")
(emphasis added).
164. SeeJeffers v. Tucker, No. H-L-89-004, 1994 WL 71471, at *12 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 8, 1994)
(Eiselle, J., concurring) (treating shape as objective indication of racial motivation); Sperling,
supra note 136, at 289-90 (concluding that shape "merely serves the probative function of
demonstrating" existence of obvious pretext); see also infra note 232 (describing flaws of using
objective evidence as proxy for direct evidence of State's purpose).
165. Hays, 839 F. Supp. at 1197.
166. Shawv. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
167. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 502 ("While there may be no 'natural district
shapes,' baseline expectations emerge from developed customs and practices.").
168. Pildes and Niemi, supra note 85, at 502.
169. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2841 (White, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 2843 (StevensJ., dissenting).
171. Cf Stuart Taylor, Jr., Making a Mess Instead of a Rule for Racial Genymanders, RECORDER,
July 13, 1993, at 6 (arguing that best explanation of Court's concern with shape is that "some
shapes show that race was not merely one of several criteria, but the overriding criterion").
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The difficulty with using objective criteria to determine if a
reapportionment statute classifies individuals by race is that such
measures do not explicitly assign individuals at all. Rather than
stating "black citizens vote here, white citizens vote there," a reappor-
tionment identifies and assigns tracts of land.172  In other words,
reapportionment statutes are facially neutral.1 73 The challenge for
a court applying Shaw, then, is to isolate those factors that objectively
indicate that the State is utilizing race-based decisionmaking.
The objective inquiry begins with a map. In addition to shape,
district lines should be examined in light of, among other things,
geographic and topographic features, urban/rural divisions, political
subdivisions, population concentrations,
174 and state boundaries. 75
Characteristics of the individuals within the districts are also rele-
vant.Y7 6  In addition to race, these include age, economic status,
religion, education, and community and political affiliation. 7 7 The
variety of criteria is so wide, in fact, that the objective inquiry is best
understood by the only factor that it excludes: direct evidence of the
State's purpose. As the inquiry is purely objective, the State need not
establish that such factors actually motivated a reapportionment's
design.
178
172. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. CL at 2826.
173. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing facial neutrality).
174. See infra notes 357-62 and accompanying text (addressing objective factors, including
traditional districting principles, relevant to obvious pretext claim). The majority in Shaw
referred to such factors in the context of the State's rebuttal of the plaintiffs' prima facie case,
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2827, but they are just as relevant to the plaintiffs' initial claim of
obvious pretext. See Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1200 (W.D.LA. 1993), statement of
prob. jur. flle, 62 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. Apr. 12, 1994) (No. 93-1539).
175. See, e.g., Maryland congressional district 1; Washington congressional district 2.
176. See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 106, at 619 ("[U]nless the map shows
demographic data, there is no basis for inferring anything about the racial makeup of the
constituency.").
177. See infra notes 357-62 and accompanying text (addressing objective factors, including
personal characteristics, relevant to obvious pretext claim).
178. This conclusion is based on (1) the nature of objective inquiries generally, (2) the
majority's use of phrases such as "cannot be understood," Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2828,
rather than the straightforward verb "is," and (3) the fact that the plaintiffs' case is premised on
the claim that the reapportionment will be perceived publicly as a racial classification and
therefore cause social harms: because the perceptions are based on the plan, rather than direct
evidence of the factors that led to the plan's construction, any alternative nonracial perception
reduces the likelihood of social harms.
That conclusion is debatable, however, in light of the majority's discussion of a district that
"'concentrated the bulk of the black population in a "shoestring" Congressional district running
the length of the Mississippi river'" as an example of a racial gerrymander. Shaw v. Reno, 113
S. Ct. at 2823 (quoting ERic FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
1863-1877, at 590 (1988)). IfShawpermits the State tojustify districts based on nonracial factors
that it did not even consider, why could this district not be defended as objectively designed to
trace the path of the river? It is likely that such a defense would in fact be available under Shaw,
but ultimately insufficient to defeat a racial gerrymandering claim for three reasons. First,
strong direct evidence of racial motivation was available. See id. at 2823 (noting that district was
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It is not enough for the reviewing court to amass the relevant data.
A determination must be made whether the reapportionment's design
was excessively motivated by racial considerations. More specifically,
the court must decide whether the plan is an obvious pretext for
racial classification, i.e., whether it is "so irrational on its face that it
can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate
voting districts because of their race."
179
While the majority in Shaw v. Reno was clear that the obvious
pretext standard is exacting,18° it was similarly clear that two burdens
are not placed on plaintiffs." First, no direct evidence that the
State purposefully utilized race is required.182 Second, no evidence
of either individual or group harm is required.' Proof of an
obvious pretext both establishes the State's intent and sufficiently
triggers the Court's concern for social harms.
designed by opponents of Reconstruction). Second, the State's objective justification would
likely carry little weight without some underlying explanation of the need for a riverfront
district. Finally, the State's proffered justification would be rebutted by the racial motivation
apparent in gerrymandering the "bulk of the black population," which had previously been
electorally dispersed, into a single district.
179. Id. at 2832. The district court in Hays v. Louisiana applied this language very differently,
concluding that it concerned only the plaintiffs' prima facie effort to create an inference of the
State's improper racial motivation. Hays, 839 F. Supp. at 1202; cf. infra Part IV-C (outlining
elements of plaintiffs' prima facie case). The court in Hays concluded that strict scrutiny review
was required when the State used race as a "significant[]" or "important factor." Hays, 839 F.
Supp. at 1202 n.46; see also id. at 1202 (applying test of whether "plan can be reasonably
conceived as the product of nonracial factors"). That approach, which is rejected in Part II-D
of this Note, is blatantly contrary to the plain meaning of Shaw. In effect, the court in Hays held
that the obvious pretext standard was relevant only as an allegation; the standard was treated
neither as a burden of proof for the plaintiffs' prima facie case, nor as a burden of proof for
the final resolution of the issue after the State's rebuttal. If relevant only as an unsupported
allegation, the obvious pretext standard, which is repeated throughout the majority opinion in
Shaw, see infra note 253, is relegated to the status ofjurisprudential window dressing.
180. See infra notes 365-68 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty of satisfying obvious
pretext standard).
181. These burdens relate to the plaintiffs' prima facie case, see infra Part IV-C. More
evidence may be required based on the nature of the State's rebuttal, see infra Part IV-D.
182. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2824-25 (explaining that "[n]o inquiry into legislative
purpose" is required for explicit classification and that "[tihese principles apply ... also to"
obvious pretexts for racial classification).
183. See Sperling, supra note 136, at 284; see also Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2828 (explaining
that classification "threatens special harms"); id. at 2832 ("Racial classifications with respect to
voting carry particular dangers."); Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 536 (concluding that courts
are not required to evaluate existence of harms discussed in Shaw); supra Part II-B-2 (discussing
nature of social harms). But see Calhoun, supra note 147, at 147 n.71 (contending that, on
remand, plaintiffs must prove they suffer from harms discussed in Shaw).
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B. Question One: Is a Subjective Inquiry Relevant?
The plaintiffs in Washington v. Davis attempted to prove their case
with objective evidence: blacks disproportionately failed Test 21.184
The Supreme Court rejected that theory of the case as insufficient to
establish purposeful discrimination and required the plaintiffs to
come forward with direct evidence of the government's motiva-
tion.185 A similar situation presents itself in the Shaw v. Reno
context. If the plaintiffs cannot come forward with sufficient objective
evidence of racial gerrymandering, may they rely on direct evidence
that the State intended to draw districts along racial lines?"'6
Unfortunately, no answer is certain because the majority in Shaw
explicitly left the question open.
187
1. The narrow view
It is possible to limit Shaw v. Reno to its own terms, restricting the
racial gerrymandering inquiry exclusively to inferences drawn from
objective evidence. Direct evidence of the State's intention would
therefore be beyond the scope of the cause of action. This narrow
view would substantially constrain the future application of Shaw by
shielding from challenge those districts that generally conform to
traditional districting principles, which by definition "could be
explained" in nonracial terms.
This interpretation draws heavily on both Justice O'Connor's
admonition that "reapportionment is one area in which appearances
do matter"" and the majority's frequent references to districts'
shape.'89 Additionally, although the majority could have used North
184. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 235 (1976).
185. Id. at 242.
186. This section addresses only whether direct evidence of the State's purpose is at all
relevant after Shaw v. Reno. Later sections address whether plaintiffs may state a cognizable
claim with only direct evidence, see infra Part III-C, and whatstandard of proof should be applied
to a case not based on purely objective evidence, see infra Part III-D.
187. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2828 ("It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or how
a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could
be challenged.").
188. Id. at 2827.
189. See, e.g., id. at 2820-21 (describing shape of districts in North Carolina plan); id. at 2821
(invoking traditional districting principles); id. at 2824 (discussing reapportionment "extremely
irregular on its face"); id. at 32 (applying holding to reapportionment "irrational on its face");
see also Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 484 ("[O]nly election-district configurations that convey
a dramatic visual impression of this sort implicate the principles of Shaw."); Aleinikoff &
Issacharoff, supra note 106, at 609 ("The shape of the district seems quite clearly to lie at the
core of the Court's judgment."); Harvard Leading Case supra note 147, at 204 (concluding that
shape was "salient consideration"). Taken to the extreme, this view of Shaw suggests that there
is a constitutional right to districts of regular shape. The majority, however, explicitly denied
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Carolina's "avowed purpose"' 90 of complying with the race-based
Voting Rights Act as explicit evidence of purposeful classification in
Shaw itself, it chose to limit its holding to objective criteria.
2. The expansive view
An alternative interpretation of Shaw v. Reno would make direct
evidence of the State's intention, if not sufficient standing alone, 9'
at least relevant to the racial gerrymandering inquiry. Under this
view, facts drawn from the legislative record and other sources of
legislative intention, including evidence of efforts to comply with the
Voting Rights Act, would weigh in favor of the plaintiffs' claim that
the State sought to construct a racial classification. Districts that are
not extremely bizarre in appearance would therefore not be immune
from challenge under Shaw. Several factors suggest that the Court
will explicitly adopt this more expansive view in future decisions.
Initially, the majority opinion in Shaw v. Reno is not nearly so
limited to bizarre shape as it appears at first glance. The Court
described the structure of a racial gerrymandering claim in five
passages. The two passages that specifically addressed the plaintiffs'
claim mention a requirement of distorted shape.'92 The three other
passages, however, do not discuss shape. 93 Notably, the Court
omitted any discussion of distorted shape when concluding its
analysis. 94
The Court's fundamental concern with race, rather than distorted
boundaries, also lends substantial support for this more expansive
view. In Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, racial classifications
that any such right exists, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. CL at 2827, suggesting that the Court did not
intend such a result.
190. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 472 (E.D.N.C. 1992), reu'd sub nam. Shaw v. Reno, 113
S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
191. See infra Part III-C (considering whether racial gerrymandering claim may successfully
be proven based only on direct evidence of State's intention).
192. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 ("extremely irregular on its face"); id. at 2832 ("irratio-
nal on its face").
193. Id. at 2826 ("lines [were] obviously drawn for the purpose of separating voters by race");
id. at 2828 ("rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate
voters"); id. at 2830 ("rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to
segregate citizens").
194. Id. at 2828. While the Court's holding speaks explicitly only to objective evidence, other
language in the majority opinion suggests that the Court recognized that Shaw would later be
extended to accommodate different facts. See id. at 2826 (stating that explicit holding applies
only to facts where "proof sometimes will not be difficult at all," thereby implying that different
standard could apply where proof is more difficult). In a later case, the Court could conclude
that Shaw v. Rend's limited holding, which addresses only shape, was articulated in response to
the Shaw plaintiffs' specific claim that the North Carolina plan "contains district boundary lines
of dramatically irregular shape," id. at 2820.
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are condemned only where they result from purposeful conduct.195
This requirement was extended to racial gerrymandering in Shaw v.
Reno, as the majority directed its holding to "deliberate"196 and
"purposeful[]"'19 "effort[s]"'98 of the State. An inquiry limited to
objective factors, on the other hand, is directly contrary to the Court's
view in Washington v. Davis that objective evidence will be insufficient
absent direct proof of the government's intention."
This view is also consistent with the nature of the objective inquiry.
When the State is unable to explain a district's shape, even based on
traditional districting principles that were not considered in the
reapportionment process, it becomes patent that the State purposeful-
ly created a racial classification.2" For that reason, the majority
asked not whether a district could be understood as anything other
than segregation, but whether the district could be understood as
anything other than an "effort to segregate."20' Fundamentally, it is
"race-based districting by our state legislatures [that] demands close
judicial scrutiny,''2" not the resulting districts themselves.
The social effects identified by the majority are consistent with this
view that evidence of intention is relevant. While objective factors
such as shape and racial composition cause social effects by highlight-
ing the State's racial motivation, the majority's reasoning suggests that
a district, if publicly perceived as race based, need not be overwhelm-
ingly distorted to cause such harms. Racial stereotypes stem from the
195. Id. The Court in Shaw v. Reno described racial classifications as involving intentional
action. See, e.g., id. at 2824 ("purposefully discriminatingbetween individuals on the basis of race")
(citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)) (emphasis added); id. at 2825
("'polic[ies] of assignment by race'") (quoting United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173
(1977) (Brennan,J., concurring in part)) (emphasis added); id. at 2824 ("[]aws that explicitly
distinguish between individuals on racial grounds") (emphasis added); id. at 2826 ("state legislation
classifying citizens by race") (emphasis added).
196. Id. at 2823 (citing Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 165 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)).
197. Id. at 2824 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)).
198. Id. at 2832; cf. id. at 2819 (noting that case involved "race-based state legislation designed
to benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups") (emphasis added); id.
at 2824 (discussing plaintiffs' allegation that "the State engaged in unconstitutional racial
gerrymandering"); id. (discussing plaintiffs' allegation of "deliberate segregation") (emphasis
added).
199. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (recounting Supreme Court's holding in
Washington v. Davis).
200. In effect the State is told, "Come up with any excuse you can make up." If no nonracial
excuse is forthcoming, then the reapportionment must be race-based. As Holmes instructed
Watson, once one has eliminated every alternative, whatever remains, however improbable, is
the answer. In this sense, the objective inquiry operates to some degree like strict scrutiny
review, which "'smoke [s] out' illegitimate uses of race." City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
201. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993).
202. Id. at 2832.
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assumption that members of a particular racial group share a strict
community of interest. Distorted boundaries may highlight these
stereotypes, but they do not actually create them. Similarly, when a
particular racial group is intentionally made the electoral majority in
a district, the elected representative may perceive a mandate to cater
to the interests of that group. Again, distorted boundaries may
highlight the district's intended design, but the boundaries themselves
do not create the design. °3
This result occurs because direct evidence of subjective intent can
itself be objectively perceived. If the State openly admits that it
designed districts in an effort to comply with the Voting Rights Act,
such a pronouncement would be in the public eye just as would the
districts' final construction. 4 It is therefore critical that Justice
O'Connor declared "appearances do matter,"20 ' a.k.a. the State's
motivation must be "apparent, "206 not that "shapes matter."
20 7
The foregoing analysis strongly suggests that direct evidence of the
State's intent should not be excluded from a racial gerrymandering
challenge. 2 1 Importantly, such evidence by definition differs from
203. The more limited view suggests, incorrectly, see infra notes 274-77, that there is a
constitutional right to live in districts with boundaries that are not bizarre.
204. See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 106, at 641 (concluding that obvious pretext
exists "if the state has announced the race consciousness of its plan"). It is conceivable that
social harms would not occur in this circumstance because the public would be fully aware that
the State's purpose was remedial. See infra note 232 (discussing flaws of Shards reliance on
objective factors).
205. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
206. See supra Part II-B-2 (explaining importance of public perceptions to social harms).
207. But see Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 536 (treating "appearances" as reference to
shape).
208. Non-shape related evidence of purpose may also be impossible to exclude from a racial
gerrymandering case. In Stage I1 of the prima facie inquiry, the State is permitted to introduce
its own evidence of purpose in an effort to rebut the plaintiffs' claims. This evidence includes
a whole range of districting and demographic criteria. See infra notes 357-62 and accompanying
text (discussing factors available to State in rebutting inference of obvious pretext). Simple
fairness would seem to permit the plaintiffs to introduce evidence, which would not necessarily
be related to shape, to refute the State's claims. It may then be impossible to draw the line
between the plaintiffs' attempt to disprove claims by the State and advance their own prima facie
case.
Assuming that the expansive view is correct, why did the Shaw v. Reno majority fail to explicitly
permit the introduction of all evidence of purposeful classification? There are at least two
possible answers. First, the majority may simply have wanted to consider the impact of its
decision in the lower courts before extending its holding even further. This is a specific
application of the doctrine that the Supreme Court will not announce constitutional rules that
are not necessary to the question presented in a case. See Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702,
706 (1966) (noting that Court will not issue constitutional decision when question or case is
decided on other grounds); Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 304 U.S.
61, 64 (1938) (stating rule of Court that "no Constitutional question will be passed upon unless
necessary for disposition of the pending case"). For example, the majority may have been wary
of adopting a holding so far from its assertion of probable jurisdiction. See Shaw v. Barr, 113
S. Ct. 653 (1992).
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objective proof by encompassing only those factors actually considered
by the State in the districting process. This general conclusion,
however, leads to another question: May plaintiffs prevail on a racial
gerrymandering claim with only direct evidence of the State's purpose
and none of the objective factors discussed in Shaw v. Reno?2°" Or,
as Professors Aleinikoff and Issacharoff put the question, "Would
geometry serve not only as a sword to condemn .. .but [also] as a
shield to protect an otherwise suspect racial classification?""'
Again, this issue was explicitly left open in Shaw."'
C. Question Two: Are There Threshold Objective Requirements?
1. The expansive view
An expansive reading of Shaw v. Reno is that there is no require-
ment of objective evidence."' Under this view, a district that is
utterly compact and does not demonstrate an untoward racial
composition is still subject to challenge based on direct evidence that
the State intended to create a racial classification. 3  As it is di-
A second possible explanation is that omitting the distorted shape requirement would have
required overruling United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). The majority in Shaw
v. Reno distinguished UJO by limiting it to compact districts. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816,2829
(1993). The Court facilitated a future decision that would abandon the distorted shape
requirement, however, by minimizing UJO's importance and relevance. See id. at 2829-30
(describing UJO as "highly fractured" and concerned with "unconstitutional vote dilution").
209. Rhetorically, one could describe a claim based purely on direct evidence as a "racial
gerrymandering claim," the verb form, while a purely objective claim would be against a "racial
gerrymander," the noun form. Unfortunately, however, two phrases are used interchangeably
in Shaw. Compare, e.g., id. at 2821 (noting plaintiffs' claim "that the State had created an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander") (emphasis omitted) with id. at 2824 (noting plaintiffs'
claim "that the State engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering").
210. Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 106, at 641.
211. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2828 (stating Court's determination to "express no view
as to whether 'the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more' always gives
rise to an equal protection claim") (quoting id. at 2839 (White, J., dissenting)); see also id. at
2832 (declining to decide whether reasonably compact alternative to district 12 could be
challenged under Fourteenth Amendment).
212. SeeSperling, supra note 136, at 286 (arguing that Shaw requires "that courts must subject
race-based redistricting to itrict scrutiny"). But see id. at 290 n.5 (hypothesizing that majority in
Shaw discussed shape in order to avoid applying strict scrutiny to all efforts to comply with
Voting Rights Act).
213. SeeJeffers v. Tucker, No. H-L-89-004, 1994WLat 71471, at*12 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 8,1994)
(EiselleJ., concurring) ("It is my opinion that race-conscious gerrymandering for the purpose
of creating majority (or super-majority) legislative districts must meet the strict scrutiny
requirements of the equal protection clause, whatever the appearance of the resulting district.").
This was the view adopted incorrectly, see infra Part III-C-3, by the district court in Hays v.
Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1195 (W.D.L.. 1993), statement of prob.jur.filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3670
(U.S. Apr. 12, 1994) (No. 93-1539) ("Shaw primarily deals with the problem of proving racial
gerrymandering indirectly or inferentially.... But racial gerrymandering may-afortori--also be
proved by direct evidence that a legislature enacted a districting plan with the specific intent of
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vorced from the criteria so critical and unique in Shaw itself, shape
and unusual racial composition, this interpretation would dramatically
expand the number of redistricting plans that would be found to
violate the Equal Protection Clause.
This view of Shaw seems to proceed easily from the previous
conclusion that evidence of purpose is relevant.214 The majority was
concerned with purposeful racial classification more than with
distorted boundaries. Additionally, Washington v. Davis teaches the
importance of directly proving the State's intention. 1 5 As for the
harms discussed by the majority, Justice O'Connor did not state that
only the objective evidence presented by the plaintiffs in Shaw would
yield a cognizable claim. Instead, the Court's concern was simply that
the act of "[c]lassifying citizens by race . . . threatens special
harms. 216
2. The narrow view
A more narrow interpretation of Shaw is that plaintiffs must rely, at
least to some degree, on objective evidence of racial gerrymander-
ing."' This reading of the decision begins with the notion that
"appearances do matter."2 8 While, as noted above, this phrase does
not translate into "shape does matter," the language emphasizes that
the decision is implicated only where the challenged re-
apportionment's racial basis is "apparent" or "obvious."
This is no abstract requirement, as appearances relate directly to
the majority's theory of social harms. Only when the public perceives
decisionmaking as race based do stereotypes and distortions in the
democratic process arise. 219  Therefore, while it is true that shape
is not the only conceivable trigger for social harms, there must be at
least some trigger. When all the available objective evidence suggests
that the State was motivated by nonracial considerations, such as
compactness, it is very unlikely that the public will perceive the
segregating citizens into voting districts based on their race.").
214. See supra Part III-B.
215. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's holding in
Davis).
216. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2828 (emphasis added); see Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra
note 106, at 597 (arguing that majority of Supreme Court has concluded that "race-conscious
measures warrant strict scrutiny" even absent proof of individual or group harms); id. at 633
("[I]t is not clear why the same [dignitary] harm is not suffered in race-conscious districting
regardless of the shape of the district.").
217. An even narrower view of Shaw is that direct evidence of the State's purpose is not at
all relevant. That interpretation of the decision was rejected earlier in this Note. See supra Part
III-B.
218. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
219. See supra Part II-B-2 (explaining importance of public perceptions to social harms).
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districts as race based, no matter what direct evidence the plaintiffs
can glean from the reapportionment process.2
3. The solution: a full examination of purpose
A strong case is presented by both the expansive and narrow views
on whether some threshold level of objective evidence is required. It
is certainly true that there must be public perceptions for social harms
to occur. On the other hand, the underlying principle of Shaw is the
impermissible use of race. In reality, however, these two positions are
actually quite similar, and the differences turn on what one means by
the State's purpose.
Speaking broadly, in the Shaw v. Reno context, redistricting can be
bifurcated into what Professors Pildes and Niemi refer to as Decision
A and Decision B."' The reapportionment process begins with a
virtually limitless number of possible district designs.22 Decision A
is to create one or more majority-minority districts. 223 Because the
possible plans that include majority-minority districts are a limited
subset of the larger pool, Decision A narrows the range of available
redistricting options. This decision may be motivated by a desire to
comply with the Voting Rights Act or any number of other concerns.
Decision B is where to place the majority-minority district(s) on the
state map and the particular shape(s) to be used, 4 which progres-
sively reduces the range of options until a concrete reapportionment
plan emerges.
In Shaw v. Reno, the theory behind the use of objective evidence is
that a reapportionment map will publicly reflect the State's subjective
intent in designing the map.225 For example, the fact that North
Carolina districts 1 and 12 are majority-black, while the statewide
average is approximately twenty-percent black,226 reflects the State's
Decision A to intentionally create majority-minority districts and
thereby satisfy the Attorney General's section 5 concerns. Similarly,
220. See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 106, at 610 (explaining Supreme Court's logic
that district's "visible racial component ... flashes the message: 'RACE, RACE, RACE'"); id. at
614 (arguing that compact districts are perceived as based on nonracial factors); Harvard Leading
Cas supra note 147, at 203 (arguing that without objective trigger, district "appears to be only
an accident of geography").
221. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 517.
222. See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 106, at 620; Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at
489.
223. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 517 (contending that Decision A was actually made
byJustice Department in requiring creation of second majority-black district).
224. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 517.
225. See supra Part II-B-2.
226. Federal Brief, supra note 85, at app. D.
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the fact that district 12 connects cities across the state's center reflects
a Decision B to link urban areas.
In presenting evidence of intent, the plaintiffs will generally focus
on Decision A because it is the choice to create a majority-minority
district that is apt to be most race based. It is unquestionable that
such evidence is relevant. For example, if the government makes a
race-based decision to fire one of ten black police officers, but
chooses the specific officer based on which of the ten was least
efficient-a nonracial consideration, evidence of the initial decision
would certainly be relevant in a discrimination suit. The same is
suggested by the majority opinion in Shaw v. Reno, which discusses the
State's race-based effort to secure section 5 preclearance.227
Accepting the relevance of Decision A, what of Decision B concern-
ing district placement and design? The difficulty with excluding such
evidence is that Decision A has no objective correlate. None of the
factors discussed in Shaw v. Reno, such as traditional districting
principles and economic status,228 are relevant until the district is
actually designed and laid out on a map. Only then can the
reapportionment be perceived, or not perceived, as a racial classifica-
tion.
In contrast to Decision A, it is the State that is likely to rely on
evidence of Decision B. This is true because nonracial factors come
to the fore during the latter stages of the reapportionment pro-
cess.229 For example, North Carolina refined its initial decision to
create two majority-minority districts by designing district 12 to be
predominately urban and by protecting incumbents.23 0  It is this
type of evidence that the State would argue compensates for the race-
based Decision A, so as to make the challenged reapportionment, on
the whole,211 not an obvious pretext for racial classification.
227. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2820-21 (1993). The district court in Hays v. Louisiana
incorrectly, see infra notes 232-33 and accompanying text, limited the direct inquiry into purpose
exclusively to Decision A. See Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1201 (W.D.L.A. 1993),
statement of prob.jur.filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. Apr. 12, 1993) (No. 93-1539) (discussing State's
"core decision"); id. at 1201 n.43 (dismissing evidence of Decision B factors); id. at 1204
(concluding that "race was the overarching factor that drove the actual creation of the Plan")
(emphasis added).
228. See infra notes 357-62 and accompanying text (outlining factors relevant to State's
rebuttal of plaintiffs' prima facie case).
229. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 517.
230. See supra notes 85-109 and accompanying text (discussing factors considered by North
Carolina in reapportionment process).
231. See infra Part IV-C-2 (setting out totality of circumstances approach to determining
existence of racial classification). An extreme example is the threshold requirement that every
district must have nearly equal populations. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 738 (1983);
Kilpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 532 (1969). Any perception of the equal-population
requirement's effect on district design is overwhelmed by all the other factors considered later
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This discussion clarifies the relationship between objective and
subjective evidence. The objective evidence relevant in Shaw reflects
the State's subjective intention throughout the reapportionment
process. Most objective factors, however, arise as a result of the
State's later Decision B concerning district design. When the
plaintiffs are unable to identify any objective factors that demonstrate
racial classification, it is therefore very likely that the State's Decision
B was non-race-based. Accordingly, the narrow view - that the
plaintiffs cannot succeed in a racial gerrymandering claim without
some objective evidence - is simply the equivalent of requiring the
plaintiffs to prove that the State's race-based Decision A has not been
made sufficiently race-neutral by factors later considered in Decision
B.
Understanding that Shaw v. Reno is premised on the belief that the
State's intention, including Decision B, is reflected on the face of the
reapportionment map also identifies a fundamental flaw in the
decision's logic. 2 ' What the State affirmatively chooses to do, for
in the reapportionment process.
232. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 517 ("[T]he case would then actually present a
conflict between social perceptions and political realities."); Haroard Leading Case supra note 147,
at 199-200 (arguing that Shaw is "disturbingly rooted in objections to the way things look, rather
than the way things are"). There are at least eight flaws in the use of objective evidence as a
proxy for direct evidence of the State's purpose. First, objective evidence underestimates the
State's use of nonracial factors because the State's race-neutral decision not to do something is
not objectively reflected on a reapportionment map. Second, objective evidence overestimates
the State's use of race because race-neutral concerns may force the State to select a district that
is more obviously race-based than otherwise available alternatives. Third, the public cannot
comprehend the vast range of factors the legislature considers in the reapportionment process
by looking at the static result, a map. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 585 (noting how "the
design of even a single district... reflects the cumulation of hundreds of small decisions").
Fourth, in the reapportionment context, objective evidence necessarily includes data relating to
both the challenged district and the surrounding area, see infra notes 296-97 and accompanying
text (setting out rubber-band standard), the complexity of which the public is unlikely to
comprehend fully. Fifth, the decision requires an unlikely depth of perception by the public:
social harms assume the perception of the State's race-based decisionmaking, but not the State's
benign motivation, e.g., rectifying previous voting discrimination, which would presumably
mollify public perceptions. Sixth, the public may draw the wrong inference because one
objective factor can have multiple possible explanations. For example, the design of a district
that includes many urban areas could be based on urban interests generally, racial interests
(because urban populations have disproportionately high minority concentrations), or political
interests (because Democrats draw political strength from urban areas). Seventh, strictly
applied, the objective standard allows the State to put forward justifications for the
reapportionment's design that were not even considered in the redistricting process, see supra
note 178 and accompanying text, a result contrary to the Court's concern in Washington v. Davis
with purposeful discrimination. Eighth, an objective standard fails to identify many instances
of gerrymandering. As explained by Justice White in his Shaw dissent, "[A] regularly shaped
district can just as effectively effectuate racially discriminatory gerrymandering as an odd-shaped
one. By focusing on looks rather than impact, the majority 'immediately casts attention in the
wrong direction-toward superficialities of shape and size, rather than toward the political
realities of district composition.'" Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2841 (White, J., dissenting)
(quoting ROBERT G. DIXONJR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND
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example, create a primarily urban district, is objectively reproduced
in the reapportionment plan. What the State chooses not to do,
however, has no objective correlate. For example, North Carolina
placed district 12 in the state's center in order to protect southern
incumbents. While this nonracial consideration was critical to the
district's design, no key on the reapportionment map notes that it was
considered and it, accordingly, has no impact on the public's
perception.
Not only is it therefore possible for the State's use of nonracial
factors to be underestimated, but, conversely, the State's reliance on
race may be overestimated. The North Carolina General Assembly
placed district 12 in the state's central region largely for a nonracial
reason, incumbency protection. In doing so, however, the State so
substantially limited its options for creating a second majority-black
district that the district must wind and twist for 160 miles in order to
accumulate a sufficiently large minority population. As each curve in
the district's boundary must correlate with race, the district appears
to be designed only on the basis of race.
Limiting the racial gerrymandering inquiry to objective evidence
and direct evidence of the State's intention in Decision A, but not
Decision B, therefore deprives the reviewing court of evidence
extraordinarily relevant to the State's defense. This plaintiff-favoring
result is directly contrary to the stringent obvious pretext burden of
proof applied in Shaw. It is also contrary to the spirit of Washington
v. Davis, which suggests a direct inquiry into the State's intent as a
means of explaining the plaintiffs' objective evidence.z 3
The conclusion that follows is that there are threshold objective
requirements to a racial gerrymandering claim, in that objective
factors are perceived by the public and reflect the State's intention in
Decision B.2 4 That analysis, however, does not answer one remain-
ing question: What standard of proof should courts apply to claims
based in part on direct evidence of the State's purpose?
POLITICS 459 (1968)).
233. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's holding in
Davis).
234. Cf Harvard Leading Case; supra note 147, at 200 (concluding that Shaw v. Reno draws
"important constitutional distinction between race-conscious line-drawing that results in strange
shapes, and race-conscious line-drawing that results in squares and rectangles").
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D. Question Three: What Standard of Proof Applies
to Claims That Are Not Purely Objective?
Limited to its explicit holding, Shaw v. Reno mandates that objective
claims of racial gerrymandering satisfy the stringent obvious pretext
standard,"5 which requires that the challenged reapportionment be
"unexplainable on grounds other than race."" 6 The preceding
analysis suggested that the Supreme Court will likely move beyond
that holding to permit the introduction of direct evidence of the
State's intention in the reapportionment process. In voting-rights law,
this is analogous to vote-dilution claims, which are based in part on
direct evidence of the State's racial motivation. 237  Importantly, a
successful vote-dilution claim requires that race be only a substantial
or motivating factor in the State's decisionmaking.238 The question
arises, then, whether a racial gerrymandering claim that involves
direct evidence of the State's intention is also to be resolved under
the more permissive substantial or motivating factor standard.239
That question can be answered by envisioning such a plaintiff's
claim as a "hybrid" between a racial gerrymandering and a vote-
dilution claim, which would involve the more permissive elements of
both kinds of claims. As to purpose, the plaintiffs would prove that
race was a substantial or motivating factor, but not the essentially
exclusive consideration, utilized by the State; this aspect would
resemble a vote-dilution claim. As to effect, the plaintiffs would not
prove that they had been excluded from the political process, as
required in vote-dilution claims, but instead would rely on the social
harms of racial classifications; this aspect would resemble an obvious-
pretext claim.
235. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2825 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
236. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
237. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's holding in
Mobile v. Bolden).
238. The substantial or motivating factor standard was applied to the voting-rights context
in Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 228, 232 (1985). While Hunter concerned vote deprivation,
and not vote dilution, it is likely that the same standard, drawn from Mt. Healthy City Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977), would still apply. No matter what the particular
burden of proof, however, the only point relevant here is that the obvious pretext standard is
more stringent than that applied to vote-dilution claims.
239. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 576 ("Whether in such situations the enhancement
of minority representation must be a motivating factor, the dominant motivating factor, or the
exclusive motivating factor remains an open question.").
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1. The expansive view
Under one interpretation of Shaw v. Reno, such a hybrid claim
would be allowed. This view is based on the belief that the Court
finds the use of race in designing electoral systems so distasteful that
proof of individual or group harm is no longer required, regardless
of what standard of proof is applied. Two aspects of the majority's
logic combine to support such a view. First, obvious-pretext claims are
based on the Fourteenth Amendment's protection from racial
discrimination and do not require proof of individual or group
harms.240 Second, the majority held that the Fourteenth
Amendment's "central purpose is to prevent the States from purpose-
fully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race."
241
Therefore, whenever the State "purposefully discriminat[es] between
individuals," proof of individual or group harms is not required, even
where the challenged measure is not so extremely race based as to be
an obvious pretext for racial classification.
If such claims were found to be cognizable, the number of
successful challenges to electoral systems would increase substantially
because the strict elements of vote-dilution and obvious-pretext claims
currently present formidable barriers to plaintiffs.242 The Shaw v.
Reno majority explicitly noted that obvious pretexts rarely will be
established because the challenged measure must be unexplainable on
grounds other than race.243 Similarly, vote-dilution claims are very
difficult to prove because few groups can establish that they have been
excluded from the political process.
24
A hybrid standard's impact on attempts to comply with the Voting
Rights Act, which explicitly requires the consideration of race,
245
240. See Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (announcing obvious-pretext
standard as method of proving Fourteenth Amendment violation).
241. Shawv. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)).
The expansive view interprets the Court's use of the stringent obvious pretext standard as
necessary to compensate for errors inherent in the use of objective evidence to determine
subjective motivation, cf supra note 232. Because objective evidence exaggerates the State's
racial motivation, requiring plaintiffs to provide objective evidence from which it can be inferred
that race was essentially the only factor used by the State guarantees that race was at least a
substantial or motivating consideration in the reapportionment process. According to the
expansive view, once direct, and necessarily more accurate, evidence of motivation is provided,
the more lenient substantial or motivating factor standard is appropriate.
242. Cf. Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 106, at 608 (noting that expansion of Shawwould
endanger many voting plans).
243. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2825.
244. See id. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that effects requirement limits successful
claims "for sound reasons").
245. Id. at 2847 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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would be particularly troubling. States would be subject to suit for
trying to comply with the Act by those who felt that the criteria of
section 2 did not require action or that the State's plan was not
sufficiently narrowly tailored to comply with the Act. Alternatively, if
States chose to ignore the Act, they would be subject to suit under the
provisions of section 2 itself.
2 46
2. The Narrow View
Although the majority in Shaw v. Reno did not explicitly address the
issue of hybrid claims, there are substantial indications that the
decision's holding will continue to be limited to obvious pretexts.
Initially, the existence of a hybrid claim is inconsistent with both the
Shaw majority's announcement of an obvious-pretext claim and its
affirmation of the Court's vote-dilution precedents. 247 Plaintiffs
stating a hybrid claim would establish that race was a substantial or
motivating factor utilized by the State248 but would not prove any
individual or group harm. There would therefore never be any need
to plead the Shaw v. Reno obvious-pretext claim, which includes the
stricter requirement that race was essentially the only factor consid-
ered by the State. 49 Similarly, there would never be any need to
plead a vote-dilution claim, which includes the stricter requirement
that the plaintiffs' racial group have been excluded from the political
process.5' By requiring only the more permissive elements of both
obvious-pretext and vote-dilution claims, a hybrid claim thus elimi-
nates the constitutional relevance of either.
Furthermore, the harms discussed in Shaw v. Reno, which are caused
by the social perceptions of the existence of a racial classification,25'
support the conclusion that a hybrid claim is not cognizable. Public
stereotyping on the basis of race is encouraged where an election
system is perceived to have been designed based only on race.
Similarly, elected officials who perceive that their district was drawn
246. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (discussing § 2 of VRA).
247. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2825 (noting vote-dilution standard); id. at 2828
(discussing and distinguishing vote-dilution decisions); id. ("Classifying citizens by race . . .
threatens harms that are not present in our vote-dilution cases."); id. at 2829 (discussing
application of vote-dilution standard in UnitedJewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977)); id.
at 2829-30 (holding that "UJO set forth a standard under which white voters can establish
unconstitutional vote dilution").
248. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
249. The expansive view thus assumes that the Supreme Court, while explicitly reaffirming
UJO and its other vote-dilution precedents, see supra note 247 and accompanying text, actually
intended to sub silentio overrule those same decisions. That is, at best, unlikely.
250. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing plurality opinion in United
Jewish Organizations. v. Carey).
251. See supra Part II-B-2.
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to benefit one racial group's interests are more likely to cater to that
group. On the other hand, where no obvious pretext exists, the
challenged measure by definition can be explained, and therefore
perceived, on grounds other than race. 2
Much of the rhetoric utilized by the Court in Shaw also suggests
that hybrid claims will not be recognized in the future. Each time the
majority discussed the structure of a racial gerrymandering claim, it
included the requirement that the reapportionment could be
understood only as an obvious pretext for a racial classification.
253
The Court also further restricted the scope of its holding with the
value-laden term "rationally."254  This indicates that some form of
rationality review applies, a far cry from a hybrid standard that would
condemn even those election systems in which race was only a
substantial or motivating consideration.
This painstaking attempt to limit the scope of Shaw v. Reno is
apparent throughout the Court's opinion. The majority repeatedly
emphasized that its concern was limited to those circumstances where
the State furthers "only" racial interests. 2 5  Similarly, the Court
condemned legislation that is "race-based,"256 but not that which is
"race conscious."257 Justice O'Connor's rhetoric indicates that Shaw
v. Reno extends only to legislation that "will permit of no other
conclusion"258 than that the districts were "obviously . . . created
solely""9 on the basis of race by "disregarding"26° nonracial char-
acteristics.
252. See supra Part II-B-2 (discussing relevance of perceptions to social harms).
253. See id. at 2824 ("can be viewed only"); id. at 2826 ("obviously drawn"); id. at 2828, 2830
("cannot be understood as anything other"); id. at 2832 ("can be understood only").
254. Id. at 2824 ("rationally can be viewed only"); id. at 2826, 2828, 2830 ("rationally cannot
be understood as anything other"); i&. at 2829 ("rationally could be understood only").
255. Id. at 2824 ("rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate"); id. at 2826
("district lines [that) could 'be explained only in racial terms'") (quoting Wright v. Rockefeller,
376 U.S. 52,56 (1964) (Harlan,J., dissenting)); id. at 2829 ("rationally could be understood only
as an effort to segregate"); id. at 2832 ("reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that
it can be understood only as an effort to segregate"). Ten different phrases similarly
emphasized the stringent nature of the inquiry. See id. at 2824 ("rationally can be viewed only");
id. at 2825 ("unexplainable on grounds other"); id. ("could not be explained on grounds
other"); id. at 2826 ("could be explained only"); id. ("permit of no other conclusion"); id. at
2827 ("obviously ... created solely"); id. at 2828 ("rationally cannot be understood as anything
other"); id. at 2829 ("immediately offends"); id. ("rationally could be understood only"); id. at
2830 ("cannot be understood as anything other"); id. at 2832 ('can be understood only").
256. Id. at 2832.
257. Id. at 2824; see also id. at 2826 ("That sort of race consciousness does not lead inevitably
to impermissible race discrimination.").
258. Id.




Other aspects of the majority's opinion also demonstrate that the
Court's intolerance for the use of race in the design of voting systems
should not be overemphasized. The majority explicitly held that
colorblindness is not required in reapportionment. 1 Similarly, the
majority clearly recognized the realities of the redistricting process:
[R] edistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in
that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district
lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and
political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors.
That sort of race consciousness does not lead inevitably to imper-
missible race discrimination. 62
This analysis suggests that Shaw v. Reno will be limited to obvious-
pretext claims and not extended to permit hybrid claims that do not
require proof of unconstitutional vote dilution. The decision,
therefore, implicates only those election systems that are "unexplain-
able on grounds other than race."263 Having determined the scope
of Shaw v. Reno, Part IV addresses the application of the obvious-
pretext standard in practice.
IV. APPLYING THE OBVIOUS-PRETEXT STANDARD:
THE PRIMA FAcIE CASE METHOD
In Shaw v. Reno, the Supreme Court held that racial gerryman-
dering claims are to be evaluated through the obvious pretext
standard of review.2 The Court, however, was not explicit about
the step-by-step process through which this standard is to be imple-
mentedY.2 5  This section draws on the logic and language of the
majority opinion to develop a three-stage inquiry that courts may use
to apply Shaw v. Reno.
A. The Prima Facie Case Method Explained
The early academic reaction to Shaw v. Reno has been that
sufficiently distorted boundaries conclusively establish the existence
of an obvious pretext. According to Professors Pildes and Niemi,
"[D] istrict appearance triggers strict scrutiny, after which jurisdictions
must offer sufficient justifications to account for 'highly irregular'
261. Id. at 2824.
262. Id. at 2826.
263. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). Thus,
mixed-motive claims are not cognizable under Shaw.
264. Shawv. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2832.
265. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 485 ("Shaw provides no criteria to guide
reapportionment bodies or courts in judging when this line has been crossed.").
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shapes."266 Under this view, distorted boundaries provide such
strong evidence of purposeful discrimination that no inquiry need be
made into whether the State actually intended to engage in racial
gerrymandering.26 7  In the strictest sense, this is jurisprudence of
the "we know it when we see it" variety.
21
Support for this interpretation may be drawn from the decision's
emphasis on shape. The plaintiffs stressed,26 9 and the Court agreed,
that North Carolina's reapportioned boundaries appeared to be
distorted along racial lines.2  Under this view, because shape
automatically triggers strict scrutiny, all that remains is for North
Carolina, on remand, to attempt to prove that the plan is narrowly
tailored to further a compelling state interest.
27'
There are two major problems with this "conclusive-proof' interpre-
tation of Shaw v. Reno. Initially, it is inconsistent with the structure of
obvious-pretext claims. While the plaintiffs' evidence may establish an
inference of purposeful discrimination, the State still has an opportu-
nity to rebut that inference.272 The strict scrutiny standard is
applied only once the reviewing court concludes that the challenged
measure "cannot be understood" in nonracial terms.
2 7 3
266. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 537; see alsoAleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 106,
at 591 (concluding that Court in Shaw struck down North Carolina plan); id. at 623 ("We are
unaware of any comparable example of presumptions of unconstitutionality being created
exclusively by a departure from a norm that has no independent constitutional force."); Pildes
& Niemi, supra note 85, at 575 ("Under Shaw, noncompactness functions as a trigger for strict
scrutiny; once a district crosses a threshold of noncompactness, special burdens ofjustification
apply."); Polsby & Popper, supra note 74, at 652 (contending that Supreme Court rejected North
Carolina plan).
267. See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 106, at 605 ("The 'bizarre' shape of the North
Carolina district allowed the Court to forgo the search for race-dependent intent normally
required in a case of a purportedly neutral classification.").
268. Even at this basic level, the conclusive-proof view is in tension with Shaw v. Reno, which
disavows such a methodology. SeeShawv. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2827 (distancing opinion from "'I
know it when I see it'" standard, but agreeing that "'dramatically irregular shapes may have
sufficient probative force to call for an explanation'") (quoting Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725,
755 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
269. See supra text accompanying note 123 (discussing plaintiffs' gerrymandering claim).
270. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2820 (finding that North Carolina plan 'contains district
boundary lines of dramatically irregular shape"); Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 106, at 609
("The shape of the district seems quite clearly to lie at the core of the Court's judgment.").
271. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 492.
272. SeeJulia Lamber et al., The Relevance of Statistics to Prove Discrimination: A Typology, 34
HASTINGS LJ. 553, 566 (1983) (explaining that under obvious pretext standard "burden shifts
to the defendant to... negate the inference of pretext by establishing a legitimate purpose").
273. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2828; see also infra notes 274-77 and accompanying text
(recounting rhetoric in Shaw). In contrast, under the conclusive-proof view, the State's
purposeful use of nonracial considerations in the districting process is incorrectly evaluated as
a compelling state interest, see, e.g., Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 576, 580; Sean P. Dunn,
Comment, Coloring Within the Lines-The New Law Regarding Race-Conscious Reapportionment, 54
OHIO ST. LJ. 1481, 1502 (1993) ("[T]hese other factors can serve as the compelling government
interest required for racial classifications to survive strict scrutiny."), rather than rebuttal
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It is therefore not surprising that the conclusive-proof view finds
little support in the Court's opinion. Such an interpretation elevates
a requirement of compactness in districting to constitutional stature,
a result that the Court explicitly disavowed. 4  Similarly, the majori-
ty never indicated that distorted boundaries independently cause
social harms requiring immediate strict scrutiny review. Instead, the
inference drawn from the plaintiffs' evidence has "'sufficiently
probative force to call for an explanation."'275 Specifically, the State
may come forward with "objective factors that may serve to defeat a
claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines."
2 76
According to the majority, only if "the allegation of racial gerryman-
dering remains uncontradicted" on remand should the court engage in
strict scrutiny review.
77
This process, whereby the plaintiffs come forward with evidence
that is in turn rebutted by the State, is generally applied through the
"prima facie case" method. As articulated by the Supreme Court in
the Fourteenth Amendment context, this form of analysis occurs in
sequential stages. Initially, the plaintiffs must "show[] that the totality
of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference" that race was
impermissibly used in decisionmaking.2 7s  If the plaintiffs "make[]
the requisite showing, the burden shifts to the State."279 If the State
cannot overcome this inference, the challenged state action must then
satisfy strict scrutiny review.
280
B. The Prima Facie Case Method Applied to Shaw v. Reno:
The Plaintiffs' Allegations
evidence that no racial classification exists, see infra Part IV-D.
274. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
275. Id. (quoting Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 735, 752 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring))
(emphasis added). Notably, this language calls for an explanation rather than a justification,
indicating a desire for rebuttal evidence rather than proof of a compelling state interest.
276. Id. (emphasis added); cf., e.g., id. at 2825 ("unexplainable on grounds other"); id.
("could not be explained on grounds other"); id. at 2826 ("could be explained only"). This
interpretation was also the understanding of the dissent. Id. at 2840 (White,J., dissenting) ("[I]t
is the State that must rebut the allegation that race was taken into account.")
277. Id. at 2832 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2830 (explaining that "if appellants'
allegations of a racial gerrymander are not contradicted on remand" strict scrutiny must be
applied). The conclusive-proof view must interpret that language as making the procedural
point that, because the plaintiffs' claim had been dismissed by the district court for failure to
state a claim, all of the facts of the case remained to be established on remand.
278. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 (1986). The analogy to Batson is not exact,
however, because, in the Shaw context, the inference to be drawn is more stringent-that the
reapportionment is an obvious pretext for racial classification.
279. Id.
280. Id. This is true even though the burden of proof technically remains on the plaintiffs.
See Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1197 n.22 (W.D.L.A. 1993), statement of prob. jur. filed,
62 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. Apr. 12, 1993) (No. 93-1539).
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The allegations required to establish a racial gerrymandering claim
were clearly set out in Shaw v. Reno. The Court held:
[A plaintiff may] state[] a claim under the Equal Protection Clause
by alleging that the [State] adopted a reapportionment scheme so
irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to
segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race,
and that the separation lacks sufficient justification.28'
This language divides into a three-stage inquiry.
In Stage I, which has two components, the plaintiffs attempt to
establish a prima facie case. The first component concerns the
plaintiffs' allegation that the State engaged in race-based reapportion-
ment.28 2 The second component concerns the plaintiffs' burden of
creating the inference that the State's plan is so racially motivated as
to be an "obvious pretext" for racial classification. In Stage II, the
State attempts to rebut the inference of purposeful racial classifica-
tion. If the State fails to rebut this inference, the challenged
legislation is deemed to be a racial classification. The inquiry then
proceeds to Stage III, where the State attempts to satisfy the strict
scrutiny standard. 4
C. Stage I: The Plaintiffs' Prima Facie Case
1. Racial motivation: Did the State engage in an effort to segregate?
a. Direct proof
While the plaintiffs in a racial gerrymandering action must
ultimately satisfy the stringent obvious pretext standard, their first
burden is to establish that the State used race in the reapportionment
process. The discussion in Part III-B established that, although Shaw
v. Reno applies explicitly only to objective evidence, direct evidence of
the State's intent is also relevant. In practice, the plaintiffs would
bring forward such evidence in their initial prima facie claim of racial
motivation. The plaintiffs could introduce, among other things, the
legislative record, testimony of legislators and legislative aides, as well
as documentation of the State's effort to comply with sections 2 and
5 of the Voting Rights Act.
281. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993); see also Hays, 839 F. Supp. at 1197
(contending that Shaw suggests use of "an evidentiary 'minuet'").
282. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2832 (noting allegation that persons were assigned to
districts "because of their race").
283. Id. (noting allegation that district "can be understood only as an effort to segregate
voters").
284. See id (noting allegation that racial classification "lacks sufficient justification").
[Vol. 43:1135
SHAW V. RENO
b. Indirect (objective) proof
i. Racial composition
The explicit holding of Shaw v. Reno applies to the inferential proof
of racial motivation through objective evidence. This method of
proof is difficult to apply in the reapportionment context because
district lines do not classify individuals. Instead, districts are designed
to include and exclude different geographic areas.
285
In drawing district boundaries, however, legislators are aware of
race and may include or exclude certain geographic areas based on
the race of the people who live there.286 It is that form of
"discriminati[on] between individuals"281 that concerned the Shaw
v. Reno majority.2' The relevant inquiry, then, begins with a
district's racial composition.
The voting-age population of North Carolina districts 1 and 12 is
approximately fifty-three percent black 9.28  Taken alone, this infor-
mation is not very helpful. If blacks constituted fifty-three percent of
the voting-age population throughout the state, the composition of
districts 1 and 12 would not be startling. On the other hand, if the
statewide average was two percent black, these districts would be
noteworthy indeed. Thus, to determine whether the State designed
a district based on race, one must know not only the racial composi-
tion of a district, but also the racial composition of the territory
outside the district.
Strictly speaking, the area excluded from a district is the territory
encompassed by every other district in a state. Courts could therefore
compare a district's racial composition with the average for all other
districts. In North Carolina, blacks constitute twenty percent of the
voting-age population statewide.290 This comparison, however, is far
too simplistic because housing in the United States generally is not
integrated.291  North Carolina is no exception. For example, one
285. Id. at 2826.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 2824.
288. See infra Part IV-C-1-b-iii (discussing majority's concern with correlation of shape and
race).
289. Federal Brief, supra note 85, at app. D.
290. Federal Brief, supra note 85, at app. D.
291. See AnkurJ. Coel, Maintaining Integration Against Minority Interests: An Anti-Subjugation
TheomyforEquality in Housing, 22 URB. L. 369, 382-85 (1990) (describing continual failures of Fair
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area in which the state's black population is concentrated is the
coastal plain,292 and any district in that region, even one drawn at
random, likely would have a disproportionately large black population
in comparison with the state as a whole.
A legitimate comparison of racial composition needs to be more
closely related to the area proximate to the allegedly gerrymandered
district. For example, courts could compare the figures within a
district with those in a fifty-mile radius around the district.293 This
measure would better take into account the racial composition of a
region. While such an inquiry would be more accurate than a general
comparison with the entire state, it still lacks sophistication.
The Court in Shaw v. Reno considered boundaries on the theory
that shape, when properly interpreted, can give an indication of which
factors were considered in designing a district.294 By considering
the curves in a boundary line, it is possible to discover what has been
intentionally included in, and excluded from, a district. For example,
a district that resembles the capital form of the letter "U" was likely
drawn to include the area within the district, but to exclude the area
between the left and right posts of the "U." The most accurate
inferential conclusion about the factors considered in the district's
design will therefore likely be drawn from a comparison of those two
areas.
In reality, district shapes are much more complicated than the
letter "U"; as with district 12, a district may appear to wander in a
haphazard and tortured fashion across much of a state.295 An
individual district may have hundreds of small U-shaped extensions
that capture particular voters and omit others. Notwithstanding such
complications, it is possible to apply a statistical device that
operationalizes the general principle that districts are drawn to both
include and exclude.
The tool that best captures the theory underlying Shaw is known as
the "rubber-band" measure (see FIGURE 3),296 which provides the
Housing Act to end racially segregated housing patterns).
292. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2820 (1993) (citing OLE GADE & H. DANIEL STILLWELL,
NORTH CAROLINA: PEOPLE AND ENVIRONMENTS 65-68 (1986)).
293. Cf Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 557 (describing population test gauged by
minimum circumscribing circle around district).
294. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 114-15 (describing district 12); FIGURE 2.
296. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 557. Pildes and Niemi reject the use of the rubber-
band test in the Shaw context. Id. at 558. They do so, however, only by considering whether
the rubber band appropriately measures compactness, id., and do not attempt to apply the test
to determine racial composition. To the extent that one agrees with the critiques of using
objective evidence to determine subjective intention, see supra note 232, the rubber-band
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composition of "the area that would be inside a rubber band
stretched tightly around the district."29, 7 The rubber-band measure
therefore allows a comparison of a district's racial composition with
that of all of the areas that the district was apparently designed to
exclude. Data for the relative racial compositions are available by
dividing the proportion of the relevant racial group in the rubber-
band-enclosed area by the proportion in the challenged district. The
closer the quotient is to one, the smaller the indication of racial
gerrymandering.




If the District is
50% black and the
Rubber-band area is
10% black, then the
Rubber-band measure is
.10 / .50 = .20.
When a plaintiff challenges the boundaries of a discrete entity, such
as a town, an even simpler measure is the "alteration" in populations.
This test compares the racial compositions before and after the
alleged gerrymander. As with the rubber-band measure, the scale
runs from zero to one, with zero representing massive racial gerry-
mandering. For example, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the Supreme Court
considered a plan that modified the boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama
and thereby excluded 396 of the city's 400 former black voters, but
measure suffers from many of the same flaws. Additionally, the measure does not reflect the
fact that the district and rubber-band areas may differ dramatically in population size. The test
is intended only as a quantifiable measure of the majority's theory in Shaw.
297. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 557. In this context, the rubber-band data is the
numerator and the district data is the denominator. If, on the other hand, the inquiry was into
whether a district had been gerrymandered to exclude racial group, the district data would be
the numerator and the rubber-band data would be the denominator.
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none of the 600 white voters. 29 ' The "alteration" in the city's black
population was accordingly massive:
29
Alteration in black voting population (4 / 400) 0.01
Alteration in white voting population (600 / 600) 1.00
Net alteration (black / white alteration: .01 / 1.00) 0.01
ii. Shape and the quantitative v. qualitative debate
Regardless of what measure of a district's racial composition is used,
the information obtained generally will not be sufficient to show that
a district was "obviously" drawn on racial lines. This is true even
where a district's black population is much higher than that of the
nearby excluded area. The district may have been drawn, for
example, to encompass a compact community that is largely black.
The majority in Shaw explicitly stated that where a district can be
explained in nonracial terms, such as compactness, the decision is not
implicated."°  More evidence of racial classification is therefore
needed.
The Court in Shaw turned to evidence of bizarre shape for precisely
this reason. The more distorted a district's shape, the greater the
likelihood that it has been purposefully manipulated. More impor-
tantly, bizarre shapes make it obvious that the district has been
manipulated.30'
Professors Pildes and Niemi have suggested two statistical measures
of shape. "Dispersion" measures how "tightly packed or spread out"
a district is by calculating the ratio of the area enclosed by the district
to the area of "the smallest circle that completely encloses the
district. 30 2 A circular district scores a perfect 1.0, closely followed
by a square. 3  The more thin extensions a district possesses, the
lower its dispersion score.0 4
298. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960).
299. Data taken from id. at 341; Petition for Certiorari at 5, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960) (No. 32).
300. Shawv. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2826 (1993).
301. See supra Part III-C-3 and accompanying text (explaining why some objective evidence
of racial gerrymandering is required by Shaw).
302. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 554.
303. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 554.
304. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 554.
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A second measure of shape is "perimeter," which calculates the
irregularity of a district's borders."0 5 The perimeter score is the
ratio of the area enclosed by the district to "the area of a circle with
the same perimeter." °" The more a district's boundaries wind and
twist without enclosing much territory, the lower the district's
perimeter score will be.30 7 A circle again scores a perfect 1.0.
Professors Pildes and Niemi defend such statistical measures based
on the need for "clear and consistent standards for courts and
reapportionment bodies to follow."' °  If courts consider shape
without an objective measure, Pildes and Niemi contend, inconsistent
determinations of when a district is sufficiently "bizarre" would
result." 9  Moreover, "bizarre" is a relative term, and statistics
provide a necessary baseline with which to compare a challenged
district to others around the state and nation.310  In the North
Carolina plan, districts 1 and 12 score very poorly in terms of both
dispersion and perimeter,' which, to Pildes and Niemi, suggests
that these measures track the concerns of the majority in Shaw v.
Reno.312
The Court, however, declined to employ any form of statistical
measure, a point that Pildes and Niemi concede.313  According to
305. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 555.
306. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 555.
307. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 556.
308. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 539; cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 157 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (criticizing use of vague standards in voting rights).
309. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 539. Words such as "irregular" and "irrational" are
not self-defining, and the Court did not provide any regular or rational reapportionment plans
for comparison. This is problematic, as explained by Professors Lowenstein and Steinberg:
[T]he drawing of lines cannot be characterized as manipulative (in a pejorative sense)
unless there is a method of drawing lines that is agreed to be nonmanipulative ....
The questions are: What, if anything, constitutes a "neutral" districting plan, and how
can we recognize a neutral plan when we see one?
Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 44, at 10.
310. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 539.
311. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 562 thl. 2.
312. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 557-58.
313. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 566 (noting that Shaw v. Reno does not guide
interpretation of dispersion or perimeter scores); see Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc.,
v. Schaefer, Civ. A. Nos. S-92-510 & S-92-1409, 1994 WL 60894, at *37 (D. Md. Jan. 14, 1994)
(Smalkin, J., dissenting) ("The Supreme Court has indicated that a court should make what
might be called a 'geometric' or 'eye-ball' evaluation of the district. That Court's decisions in
Shaw and Growe clearly suggest that a district is not geographically compact if its shape is
'bizarre' or 'dramatically irregular.'"); cf. Lynne Duke, Advocates Say Justices Muddy Voting Rights,
WASH. PosT, June 30, 1993, at A8 (noting that although many standards of compactness have
been developed, "there is no legal standard"). But see Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 106,
at 622 (explaining that Reynolds v. Sanders, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and later cases, applied
statistical formula to claim originally found justiciable in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
This post-Baker application of statistics to the one-person one-vote area is not as likely to occur
in the Shaw context, however, which is not nearly as amenable to mathematical precision.
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the majority, gerrymandering is the "'deliberate and arbitrary
distortion of district boundaries.',3 1 4  The more a district's bound-
aries are distorted, the more likely it is that the district was drawn to
include and exclude some discrete population group and will be
perceived as such. For this reason, shape provides inferential
evidence of the plaintiffs' claim of obvious pretext.3  Pildes and
Niemi, on the other hand, treat shape as an automatic trigger for
strict scrutiny review, but do not provide a calculable threshold level
of noncompactness. 31 '  As will be demonstrated below, any search
for such a threshold is fruitless.
Because shape is only one element of the plaintiffs' case, albeit an
important element, and does not automatically trigger strict scrutiny
review, the majority in Shaw v. Reno described gerrymandered districts
with words that suggest a common-sense inquiry into shape:
"dramatically irregular,"317 "extremely irregular, "318 "'un-
couth,' 3 19  "highly irregular,"2' "bizarre,"321  "irrational,3122  and
"tortured."323 Thus, while statistics can provide quantitative data for
comparison, 24 their importance should not be exaggerated. Courts
should not become so engrossed in statistical measures that they lose
sight of the inquiry into whether the challenged district is an obvious
pretext for racial classification.
314. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2823 (1993) (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109,
164 (1986)).
315. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
316. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 540 (describing determination of unacceptable
level of non-compactness as "political and legal judgment about the appropriate trade-off
between competing values"). Other critiques of Pildes and Niemi's methodology can be made
as well. First, in an effort to identify those districts that may not satisfy the level of compactness
required by Shaw, they draw on data for district 12, id. at 560, while essentially ignoring the
other challenged district, district 1. Second, they rely on rhetoric in the decision to support
their use of the perimeter and dispersion measures, id. at 557, but the majority never indicated
that the passages discussed by Pildes and Niemi were anything other than descriptive of the
particular geometric figures at issue; different districts likely would have evoked different words.
Finally, they do not attempt to correlate the perimeter and dispersion measures with public
perceptions, the critical consideration in determining social harms.
317. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2820.
318. Id. at 2824.
319. Id. at 2825 (quoting Gomilion, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960)).
320. Id. at 2826.
321. Id. at 2825.
322. Id. at 2829.
323. Id. at 2827.
324. For this reason, the rubber-band measure is suggested as a way of considering the
threshold issue of the State's racial motivation. See supra text accompanying notes 296-97
(describing and applying rubber-band measure).
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iii. The required correlation between race and shape
Having discussed the plaintiffs' evidence of both racial composition
and shape, it is necessary to understand the relationship between
those two factors. The Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno was not
concerned with shape alone. The majority held that compact districts
are not constitutionally required.3" Bizarrely shaped districts drawn
for nonracial reasons are therefore not implicated by the deci-
sion.326
Similarly, the Court was not concerned with racial composition
alone. The majority explicitly approved of the inclusion of minority
communities in a district that can be explained in nonracial terms,
such as compactness. 327 The Court was not even necessarily con-
cerned with those districts that both are bizarrely shaped and have a
disproportionately high minority population.2 8  For example, a
district may encompass a compact minority community and be
distorted so as to pack Republicans or Democrats into the district.
Such a district is not an obvious pretext for racial classification.
Shaw v. Reno is therefore implicated only where bizarre boundaries
correlate with racial housing patterns in such a way that the district
appears to have been "drawn on racial lines."31 Thus, the Court
condemned "[a] reapportionment plan that includes in one district
individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely
separated by geographical and political boundaries."3 ' Similarly,
the Court indicated that racial gerrymandering would be involved
where "a State concentrated a dispersed minority population in a
single district."33 In contrast to the examples of "widely separated"
persons being "concentrated," the Court found no fault in the
concentration of "members of a racial group [who] live together in
one community."
3 2
This discussion brings together the analysis of the plaintiffs'
objective evidence of the State's racial motivation. This inquiry begins
325. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
326. See id. at 2844 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that decision does not apply to districts
drawn "for rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic Jews, for Polish Americans, or for
Republicans"); cf. id. at 2828 (distinguishing political gerrymandering from racial gerrymander-
ing, which is "discrimination on the basis of race").
327. Id. at 2826.
328. See id. (noting that reapportionment concentrating members of racial group may
"reflect wholly legitimate purposes").
329. Id. (discussing Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964)).
330. Id. at 2827.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 2826.
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with an analysis of racial composition, perhaps through the compara-
tive measure of the rubber-band or alteration test. Shape is also
relevant and may be measured either quantitatively or qualitatively.
Distorted boundaries, however, are not probative standing alone, but
must appear to have been designed to include the relevant racial
group. The Shaw v. Reno majority indicated that the necessary factors
of racial composition, shape, and correlation between the two existed
in district 12, which "winds in snake-like fashion" 3 "'until it gobbles
in enough enclaves"' 334 "'of black neighborhoods.'
ss33 5
2. When is there an inference of obvious pretext?
A totality of the circumstances approach
The preceding discussion identified the factors relevant to the
plaintiffs' claim that the State utilized race in the districting process,
which is the first component of Stage I. The second component
concerns the requirement that such evidence establish the inference
that the challenged reapportionment is an "obvious pretext" for racial
classification. A critical question is how direct evidence of the State's
racial motivation, as well as indirect evidence, including racial
composition, shape, and traditional districting principles, should be
weighed.
One can infer a threshold requirement of racial composition from
the majority opinion in Shaw v. Reno. The Court discussed "segrega-
tion"336 and "political apartheid,""3 7 terms that suggest a complete
separation of racial groups.33 Such a threshold would not con-
demn many majority-minority districts, which frequently have slim
majorities in minority voting strength. 39  This view is supported by
the plaintiffs' allegation that the North Carolina plan was purposefully
333. Id. at 2821. This is the shape element.
334. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 476-77 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (Voorhees, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev'd sub nom. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993)).
This is the correlation element.
335. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. at 476-77 (Voorhees, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)). This is the racial composition element.
336. Id. at 2832.
337. Id. at 2827. "A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who
belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political
boundaries, and who may have little in common ... but the color of their skin, bears an
uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid." Id.
338. Cf id. at 2840 n.7 (White,J, dissenting) (arguing that population figures in district 12
do not satisfy definition of "segregation").
339. North Carolina district 12, for example, has a black voting-age population of 53% and
a white voting-age population of 47%. Federal Brief, supra note 85, at app. D. States, as
defendants in racial gerrymandering cases, would favor such a "segregation" theory because
districts that barely have more black voters than white voters can hardly be considered
segregated. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2840 n.7 (White, J., dissenting).
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designed to create congressional districts based on race and to assure
election of two black representatives to Congress."° In an era when
individuals vote not infrequently across racial and party lines, a fifty-
three percent voting-age population hardly assures the election of any
candidate. This threshold cannot be the one intended by the Court
in Shaw, however, because districts 1 and 12 have a black voting age
population only slightly over fifty percent m '1
A more moderate threshold standard would apply Shaw v. Reno only
to those districts that have a majority population of the relevant racial
group, thereby insulating minority-influence districts. Support for this
view comes from the Court's use of the phrases "majority-black"
3 42
and "majority-minority" 43 and the statistics for the districts chal-
lenged in Shaw. Both this "majority threshold" and the "segregation
threshold" discussed above, however, misread the Court's central
concern.
The majority in Shaw was concerned with the perceived impermissi-
ble use of race in decisionmaking, not the particular resulting racial
proportions. For this reason, the Court never identified any threshold
requirement for either racial composition or, as noted above,
geographic compactness. Instead, the relevance of both racial
disparity and shape suggests that proof of an obvious pretext is to be
drawn from the totality of circumstances:? extreme findings in
one element may compensate for insufficiencies in the other.
This view is borne out by the Court's discussion of the uncouth
twenty-eight-sided municipal boundary considered in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 45 which the majority cited as an example of an obvious
pretext for racial classification. 6 The difficulty with the example
of Gomillion, in light of Shaw v. Reno, is that the redrawn boundaries
340. Id. at 2821.
341. Federal Brief, supra note 85, at app. D.
342. See, e.g., Shawv. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2819 (discussing original North Carolina plan); id.
at 2820 (discussing original North Carolina plan in relation to State's geography and
demography); id. (discussing second North Carolina plan); id. (discussing district 1); id.
(discussing district 12); id. at 2831 (discussing plaintiffs' claims relating to population
distribution).
343. See, e.g., id. at 2828 (refusing to decide whether creation of majority-minority districts
alone establishes equal protection claim); id. at 2830 (discussing compliance with Voting Rights
Act as compelling state interest); id. at 2830 (discussing majority-minority district in Beer v.
United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976), as satisfying § 5 of VRA because it improved status of racial
minorities); id. at 2831 (discussing United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), which
upheld majority-minority districts).
344. Cf Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (applying totality of circumstances
test for racial motivation).
345. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
346. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2825.
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of Tuskegee were not particularly distorted (see FIGURE 4). In
statistical terms, Professors Pildes and Niemi have calculated that 239
current congressional districts are more gerrymandered according to
both perimeter and dispersion measures than was Tuskegee in
Gomillion."48 The solution to this dilemma is to concentrate not on
the shape of the boundaries in Tuskegee, but on the fact that the
challenged statute "fenced out" ninety-nine percent of the city's
former black voters, but none of its white voters.349 In terms of the
alteration measure,35° the area inside the city suddenly became
much more "white" than it had been under its former bound-
aries. 3 1 Thus, considering the totality of the circumstances, the
extreme racial disparity in Tuskegee compensates for the fact that the
boundaries were not particularly bizarre.
352





(original map is reprinted
as the Appendix to the
Opinion of the Court in
Gomillion v. Light foot,
364 U.S. 339, 348 (1960))
The totality of the circumstances approach can also be applied to
the facts of Shaw v. Reno. The racial disparity in the North Carolina
plan is much less extreme than that in Gomillion. The rubber-band
measure for districts 1 and 12 would not be nearly as low as the .01
847. See Pildes v. Niemi, supra note 85, at 552.
348. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 552 & n.192; see also id. at 564 n. 229.
349. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 839, 340-41 (1960).
850. See supra text accompanying note 298-99 (discussing alteration method).
851. See text accompanying supra note 299.
352. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 552.
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alteration measure for Tuskegee. On the other hand, the North
Carolina districts are much more distorted than those in Gomillion.
In statistical terms, on a scale from 0 to 1.0, the perimeter and
dispersion scores for districts 1 and 12 are close to 0,"' while
Tuskegee's are close to .5.354
Thus, although the facts of the two cases are almost reversed, the
result is the same (see FIGURE 5). In Gomillion, extreme racial
disparity and somewhat distorted boundaries created an inference that
the challenged statute was an obvious pretext for a racial classifica-
tion. In Shaw v. Reno, on the other hand, more moderate racial
disparity and extremely distorted boundaries created the same
inference.
FIGURE 5: ILLUSTRATION OF TOTALrIY OF CIRCUMSTANCES
Gomillion
0.0 . . /
Rubber-band i o 
' PC70 Shaw
Alteration .%-. , '/
Scale '.. .
1.0 10 vul,
1.0 (visually 0.0 (visually
compact) bizarre)
Compactness Scale
At least two factors not discussed in Shaw and Gomillion should also
be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances inquiry. The
first is direct evidence of the State's racial motivation to the extent
discernable by the public. 55 The second is the social context in
which all the other factors operate because "few Americans are likely
to be surprised that congressional districts in Harlem or Chicago's
353. The dispersion scores for districts 1 and 12 are 0.25 and 0.05 respectively. Pildes &
Niemi, supra note 85, at 562 thl. 2. The perimeter scores for districts 1 and 12 are 0.03 and 0.01
respectively. Id.
354. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 564 n.229.
355. See supra Part III-B (concluding that direct evidence of State's intention is relevant).
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south side house largely minority constituencies," but "in Iowa ... the
'racial message' would be clear."5'
The totality of the circumstances approach illustrates why any
search for a statistical threshold of noncompactness is fruitless. A
district with a high compactness score may be subject to strict scrutiny
while one with a lower score may not depending on the nature of the
State's use of race. This result is consistent with the discussion of
social harms in Shaw, which is premised on the idea that the public
does not perceive isolated factors in a vacuum, but instead reacts to
the larger message sent by governmental action.
D. Stage Il The State's Rebuttal
If the plaintiffs' evidence in Stage I "gives rise to an inference" that
the challenged measure cannot be explained on grounds other than
race, a prima facie case that the State has created a racial classification
is established. Stage II turns to the State's rebuttal. The State must,
therefore, produce evidence of factors, other than race, that can
explain the challenged reapportionment.357 While the majority in
Shaw v. Reno did not provide an exhaustive list of acceptable nonracial
factors, the Court did suggest two sets of relevant considerations.
The first set of considerations relates to the characteristics of the
individuals within the district. Even where a racial group is
disproportionately represented within a district, the State may identify
relevant nonracial demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.
The examples given by the Court were age, economic status, religion,
education, and community and political affiliation.58 Thus, a
district that is intended to be heavily Democratic may include a
disproportionate number of black voters based on their political
preference, rather than their race, without implicating Shaw.
The second set of considerations relates to the characteristics of the
districts themselves. According to the Court, the State may introduce
evidence of "[t]raditional districting principles," 59 which include,
but are not limited to, "compactness, contiguity, . .. respect for
political subdivisions,"" and "geographic boundaries."" For
356. Aleinikoff and Issacharoff, supra note 106, at 614.
357. While these factors are listed as relevant to the State's rebuttal, it is likely that the
plaintiffs would bring them to the reviewing court's attention earlier by arguing in their case-in-
chief that the challenged districts cannot be explained in nonracial terms.
358. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2826-27.
359. Id. at 2827.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 2821. This list of traditional districting principles was not intended to be
exhaustive. See id. at 2827 (prefacing list of principles with phrase "such as").
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example, a district may have a bizarre appearance because it follows
a geographic feature such as a river."6 ' In such a case, shape would
not provide evidence that the State intended to create a racial
classification.
A critical issue in Stage II is likely to be whether the State's
evidence may reflect only those factors that the legislature actually
considered in the reapportionment process. The answer to this
question depends on the nature of the plaintiffs' case. As noted in
Part III-A, to the extent that the plaintiffs rely on objective evidence,
the State may rely on objective factors that, while not considered in
the reapportionment process, would cause the reapportionment not
to be publicly perceived as race based.36 On the other hand, to the
extent that the plaintiffs rely on direct evidence of the State's intent
that may be publicly perceived, evidence of factors not a part of the
reapportionment process is less likely to rebut the plaintiffs' claim.
It must be kept in mind, however, that the ultimate inquiry is into
public perceptions of an obvious pretext, which necessarily has an
objective component.
4
The majority in Shaw v. Reno clearly intended the obvious pretext
standard to be difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy, seeking to condemn
only the most "'rare"'"6 5 and "exceptional cases." '66 That race was
a substantial or motivating factor in the State's decision is insuffi-
cient.367 Because an obvious pretext is the equivalent of an express
racial classification, the reviewing court must conclude that the
reapportionment is the functional parallel of the State sending voters
a letter that explicitly instructs them where to vote based on their
race.3" Stage III now turns to the issues that are relevant if the
State cannot rebut the plaintiffs' prima facie case.
E. Stage 1!T: Satisfying Strict Scrutiny
1. General principles
362. See supra note 178 (discussing example of district that ran along Mississippi river).
363. See supra note 178.
364. See supra Part II-C.
365. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2825 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Auth., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
366. Id. at 2826.
367. See supra Part ll-B-2 (discussing obvious pretext requirement as key to proof of social
harms).
368. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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If, at the close of Stage II, the reviewing court concludes that the
challenged measure "could not be explained on grounds other than
race,"" 9 the plaintiffs have fulfilled their burden of proving that the
State has created an obvious pretext. The existence of a racial
classification is therefore taken as established. In Stage III, the State
must then prove that it was justified in creating a racial classification
by satisfying the elements of the strict scrutiny standard.3" First, the
interest pursued by the state must be "compelling."37 Second, the
classification must be narrowly tailored to fulfill that compelling
interest.-3 2
The compelling governmental interest identified by the majority in
Shaw v. Reno was compliance with the Voting Rights Act.373  The
Court limited its endorsement, however, by noting that a compelling
state interest existed only where the Voting Rights Act was "constitu-
tionally valid as interpreted and as applied."374  In particular, the
issue of whether the Voting Rights Act could constitutionally require
the creation of a racial classification was left unanswered.375 Thus,
States seeking to defend a racial gerrymander on the basis of
compliance with the Voting Rights Act must be prepared to defend
the constitutionality of the Act in that context. Additionally, the State
must establish that the Act required it to create majority-minority
districts;376 the mere fact that racial gerrymandering does not violate
369. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2825 (citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266).
370. Id. at 2832 (noting Court's determination to use "close judicial scrutiny").
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 2830. The Court in Shaw v. Reno discussed an additional possible compelling
interest, rectifying the effects of past racial discrimination where there is a "strong basis in
evidence for concluding that remedial action is necessary." Id. at 2832 (citations and alterations
omitted). The Court strongly indicated, however, that an obvious pretext for racial classification
could be used to correct historical discrimination only where required by the Voting Rights Act.
Id. According to Justice O'Connor:
We note, however, that only three Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have
a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc voting apart from
the requirement of the Voting Rights Act. And those three Justices specifically
concluded that race-based districting, as a response to racially polarized voting, is
constitutionally permissible only when the State "employ[s sound districting
principles," and only when the affected racial group's "residential patterns afford the
opportunity of creating districts in which they will be in the majority."
Id. (quoting UnitedJewish Orgs. v. Carey, 420 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1977)) (alteration in original).
A compelling interest in remedying historical discrimination in voting apart from compliance
with the Voting Rights Act, therefore, is apparently illusory.
374. Id.
375. See id. at 2831 ("Appellants further argue that if § 2 did require adoption of North
Carolina's revised plan, § 2 is to that extent unconstitutional. These arguments were not
developed below, and the issues remain open for consideration on remand.").
376. See id. at 2830 ("[C]ourts must bear in mind the difference between what the law
permits, and what it requires.").
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the Voting Rights Act does not constitute a compelling governmental
interest.
The Court in Shaw indicated that racial gerrymandering would not
be narrowly tailored to comply with the Voting Rights Act if the State
went beyond what was reasonably necessary to comply."' Because
racial classifications are presumptively illegitimate,7 8 the State must
establish that no reasonable alternative existed that would have
satisfied the Voting Rights Act. A racial classification would not be
narrowly tailored to comply with the Act if a reapportionment could
be implemented that (1) would not sacrifice other state interests, (2)
would not violate the Voting Rights Act, and (3) would not itself be
a racial classification. Alternatively, if no other plan existed that
would satisfy the Act, a racial classification would be narrowly
tailored.3 9
2. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
The Court in Shaw v. Reno indicated that two sections of the Voting
Rights Act may require the creation of majority-minority districts.80
The first is section 2, which prohibits the enactment of a voting
procedure that results in the dilution of minority voting strength."' 1
Where the three elements outlined in Thornburg v. Gingles 2 are
satisfied, the Voting Rights Act requires the creation of majority-
minority districts to prevent minority vote dilution. In such a
situation, the "compelling interest" element of strict scrutiny is
satisfied.
Early reactions have read Shaw as placing increased emphasis on the
first prong of Gingles, the compactness requirement.383  Presented
with noncompact districts that were proposed as ostensibly required
by section 2, a threejudge panel in Jeffers v. Tucke 84 concluded that
377. Id. at 2831 (referring to § 5 compliance).
378. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 443 U.S. 256, 262 (1979) (citing Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964)).
379. An even clearer example of failure to narrowly tailor a reapportionment is the creation
of multiple majority-minority districts when only one is required by the Voting Rights Act. See
Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1207 (W.D.L.A. 1993), statement of prob. jur. filed, 62
U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. Apr. 12, 1993) (No. 93-1539).
380. SeeShawv. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2819 (193).
381. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
382. 478 U.S. 30 (1986); see supra text accompanying note 75 (reciting Gingles standard).
383. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 582 ("Courts might become more likely to find that
the Act does not require extremely noncompact districts, particularly at the stage of determining
substantive liability under the Act."); Id. at 582 n.271 ("[A]s a statutory matter, courts are
unlikely to interpret the Act to require highly irregular districts after Shaw.").
384. No. H-L-89-004, 1994 WL at 71471 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 8, 1994).
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the districts "would have to be consistent with the spirit of Shaw." 5
Similarly, in Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 8
another panel read Shaw as forbidding the implementation of plans
that elevate race "to the exclusion of traditional, nonracial districting
principles.13 7  These interpretations are mistaken, however, to the
extent that Shaw is read as determining when substantive liability
exists under section 2. Shaw explicitly does not preclude the
implementation of bizarrely shaped districts based on section 2
compliance, as long as the narrow tailoring element is satisfied.3"
It is in terms of narrow tailoring that Shaw does directly impact on
section 2. Neither the Voting Rights Act nor Gingles explicitly require
the State to adopt a district that includes the compact minority
community upon which substantive liability was based. Drawing an
analogy to constitutional law, before Shaw, section 2 itself had no
narrow tailoring requirement. For example, if North Carolina had
been found to be in violation of section 2 because it neglected to
create a majority-minority district to encompass a compact minority
community in the southern coastal plan, the State could have
complied with the Act by adopting a majority-minority district, such
as district 12, which lies nowhere near the coastal plain.
After Shaw, however, a different result occurs.389 If the State seeks
to create a majority-minority district to comply with section 2, it is
likely that the implemented district must include the relevant compact
minority community. Otherwise, the State has done more than was
reasonably necessary to comply with the Act. Similarly, if it is possible
for the State to design a majority-minority district that is itself
compact, that district must be implemented if, judging by the totality
of the circumstances, it does not constitute a racial classification."'
385. Jeffers v. Tucker, No. H-L-89-004, 1994 WL at 71471, at *6 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 8, 1994).
386. Civ. A. Nos. S-92-510 & S-92-1409, 1994 WL 60894 (D. Md.Jan. 14, 1994).
387. Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, Civ. A. Nos. S-92-510 & S-92-1409,
1994 WL 60894, at *25 (D. Md. Jan. 14, 1994).
388. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2830-32.
389. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 582 n.273 ("Even if courts become more strict in the
way they interpret the first prong of Gingies... they might still permit 'highly irregular' districts
as a remedy after liability has otherwise been found.... The legal question would then be
whether the creation of this irregular district was 'narrowly tailored' ....). Along those lines,
Shaw for the first time creates a cause of action for individuals seeking to challenge a
reapportionment on the grounds that a minority community was not sufficiently compact to
invoke the protections of § 2.
390. This does not mean, however, that the State must design the district to be as compact
as possible. SeeAleinikoff& Issacharoff, supra note 106, at 649 n.243 ("This would put pressure
on states to draw relatively compact districts ... but it could not sensibly produce a requirement
for the most compact districts - there are simply too many other variables . . . ."). If the
Supreme Court determined that Congress did not intend § 2 to require the adoption of such
districts the result in the text might be avoided because, as with § 5, see infra notes 394-98 and
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3. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
The second compelling state interest discussed by the Court in Shaw
was compliance with section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.39' In a
covered jurisdiction, preclearance will be denied if the government
cannot establish that its proposed change does not have the purpose
or effect of "denying or abridging the right to vote."392 If the
relevant discriminatory effect is a "clear violation" of section 2,"'
the strict scrutiny analysis undertaken above logically applies to
section 5 as well.
On the other hand, when purposeful discrimination or a "retrogres-
sion" of the right to vote 94 is involved, a different narrow tailoring
inquiry is appropriate. As the compactness element of section 2 is not
involved, Shaw's reference to shape finds no corresponding require-
ment in the State's proffered compelling state interest. Except to the
extent that an alternative district is not a racial classification because
it is more compact, gauging narrow tailoring according to shape
would therefore do nothing more than duplicate part of the earlier
inquiry into whether the challenged reapportionment is a racial
classification."'
Slightly modified, an examination of compactness would properly
test narrow tailoring not by focusing on shape alone, but by determin-
ing whether the State could have reduced the number of irregular
lines that capture minority communities while still including enough
minority voters to create a sufficient majority-minority district. This
view refocuses the inquiry where it belongs, on the State's use of race.
Moreover, it establishes that, in this context, shape is not itself
probative of narrow tailoring. If all that is relevant is the State's
excessive efforts to include minority communities in a district, a far
simpler and more workable test is to consider racial proportions
alone. A majority-minority district that is a racial classification and
eighty-percent black is not narrowly tailored because it goes beyond
what is necessary to ensure that minorities have an opportunity to
accompanying text, there would no longer be a relationship between the Act and compact
districts. The same would be true if Congress amended the Act to explicitly permit § 2
compliance through the adoption of any available majority-minority district. On the other hand,
narrow tailoring would still likely require the adoption of a more compact alternative to the
challenged district if it did not constitute a racial classification.
391. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
392. 28 C.F.R. § 51.52(a) (1993).
393. Id. § 51.55(b)(2) (1993).
394. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140-42 (1976).
395. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 85, at 585.
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elect the candidate of their choice as required by the Voting Rights
Act. By contrast, a fifty-five percent voting age population may be
acceptable.396
This view "'smoke[s] out' impermissible uses of race" by ensuring
that the State has not caused harm to innocent third parties" by
unnecessarily "packing" minority voters into a district under the guise
of increasing minority representation. Gauging narrow tailoring
exclusively by shape has no such advantage because, as Shaw explicitly
states, noncompactness alone does not cause a cognizable injury."98
An emphasis on shape also undermines the goals of the Voting Rights
Acts by preventing minority congressional representation when it is
most needed. If narrow tailoring under Shaw permits the creation of
only those majority-minority districts that are compact, minority
congressional representation will be possible only when housing is
segregated so that minority populations are geographically bunched
together. It is in such a situation that minorities, in terms of sheer
numbers, are most likely to be able to influence policy choices by
electing local representatives. On the other hand, when minority
communities are somewhat dispersed, and local electoral successes are
minimized, the need for national representation is greatest.
CONCLUSION
In Shaw v. Reno, the Supreme Court concluded that the obviously
race-based design of voting districts, without any proof of an effect on
individual or group rights, could violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
If this principle were extended to its logical limit, many voting systems
and the Voting Rights Act itself would be subject to significant
challenge. Fortunately, the logic and the language of the decision
indicate that the application of Shaw v. Reno will be limited to those
rare redistricting plans that are an obvious pretext for racial classifica-
tion. By applying the three-stage prima facie method discussed in this
Note, courts can faithfully implement Shaw v. Reno and be certain that
they are complying with its intended scope.
396. See, e.g., Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1208 (W.D.L.A. 1993), statement of prob.
jur.filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. Apr. 12,1993) (No. 93-1539) (concluding that 55% black voting
age population is absolute maximum permitted under strict scrutiny review). It therefore
appears that an important element of litigation after Shawis determining what, under the Voting
Rights Act, are the maximum and minimum racial composition for minority-majority districts.
397. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980) (finding effects on innocent third
parties relevant factor in determining narrow tailoring).
398. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2827; see also id. at 2841 (White, J., dissenting) ("Given two
districts drawn on similar race-based grounds, the one does not become more injurious than the
other simply by virtue of being snake-like .... ").
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